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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The act of panhandling, commonly known as begging, is a constitutionally protected
form of speech.1 But Washington’s cities are increasingly enacting ordinances that criminalize
begging.2 The consequences of criminalizing begging are severe and include violations of
First Amendment and due process rights. Indeed, these ordinances often outlaw peaceful
and nonintrusive behavior protected by the First Amendment.3 Some advocates assert that
since 2015, “100% of federal court cases have ruled bans/restrictions [on begging] are
unconstitutional.”4
Further, these laws do not contribute to a solution for homelessness; instead, they
function to remove visible poverty and homelessness from sight. Due to the nature and
penalties of these anti-begging ordinances, the debtor’s prison grows,5 and the cycle of
homelessness continues.6
Washington's Begging Restrictions
The Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (HRAP) researched the laws of sixty-four cities
across Washington State and found 121 ordinances that prohibit or restrict begging. An
overwhelming number of these ordinances punish begging as a misdemeanor, inflicting on
already vulnerable people ongoing and escalating collateral consequences.7
1

Katie Pilgram Neidig, The Demise of Anti-Panhandling Laws in America, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 543, 552 (2017).
NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 11 (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017],
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-Not-Handcuffs (surveying 187 cities and finding laws punishing lifesustaining conduct of homelessness people have increased).
3
Telephone Interview with Mark Silverstein, Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo. (Feb. 2016); see also
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (emphasizing that protected speech “does not become
unprotected merely because it resembles” unlawful speech).
4
See, e.g., Challenges to Bans of Restrictions on Panhandling, SACRAMENTO REG’L COAL. TO END HOMELESSNESS (Oct.
2017). The fact sheet from Sacramento Regional Coalition to End Homelessness cites to data collected by the
National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty found in Housing Not Handcuffs: A Litigation Manual.
5
Court imposed debts, such as fines imposed due to violations of the law, push “people deeper into poverty and
prolong[] their involvement with the criminal justice system.” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & COLUMBIA
LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISON: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3
(Feb. 2014), https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/modern-day-debtors-prisons-washington (citing Katherine A. Beckett,
Alexes M. Harris & Heather Evans, The Assessment and Consequences of Legal Financial Obligations in Washington
State, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N (2008),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf)).
6
See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2; HOMELESS RTS. ADVOC. PROJECT, The Criminalization of Homelessness:
Additional Resources, SEATTLE UNIV. SCHL. LAW, [hereinafter HRAP], https://law.seattleu.edu/centers-andinstitutes/korematsu-center/initiatives/homeless-rights-advocacy-project/additional-resources (last visited Nov.
25, 2017).
7
E.g., Maya Rhodan, A Misdemeanor Conviction is Not a Big Deal, Right? Think Again, TIME (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://time.com/76356/a-misdemeanor-conviction-is-not-a-big-deal-right-think-again/.
2

I

Key findings include:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

The vast majority of Washington cities punish begging: 86% of surveyed cities have
at least one law criminalizing begging in their municipal codes.
83% of these laws result in a misdemeanor if violated. Criminal convictions
exacerbate homelessness.8
Begging restrictions are proliferating: approximately 2/3 of all begging ordinances
were enacted after 2001.
Washington’s second most popular laws are “aggressive” begging restrictions.
In the 1990s, courts began invalidating prohibitions on peaceful begging as
unconstitutional restrictions on free speech. Many cities tried to circumvent this
outcome by incorporating non-aggressive conduct into their so-called "aggressive
begging" laws.
Only 2% of aggressive begging ordinances turn on the specific, objectively
aggressive conduct of the person begging.
For the vast majority— 98% of aggressive begging laws—a violation can occur
based solely on a bystander’s subjective perception.
If a bystander feels fearful or even feels compelled to give, such feelings may be
enough to make begging criminal regardless of whether the person begging has
done anything objectively aggressive.
42% of all aggressive begging ordinances rely exclusively on a bystander’s
subjective perception.
This reliance on whether a witness "subjectively" feels fear is highly problematic in
light of well-established science proving people tend to feel fear simply when
viewing a homeless person regardless of that person's conduct.9

Enforcement of Washington's Begging Restrictions
HRAP requested public records from eleven Washington cities10 to gain insight on
citations for anti-begging laws within the last five years. Only two cities—Marysville and
Lakewood—provided data suggesting they formally cited individuals for violating specific
begging laws within that timeframe.11 But the apparent lack of citation data from the
remaining nine cities does not mean that these cities are not enforcing their anti-begging
ordinances. To the contrary, Washington cities are likely using informal (and invisible or not
8

See HRAP, supra note 6; Sara K. Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 33 (2016) [hereinafter Rankin
2016].
9
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups that Elicit Disgust are Differently Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC.
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45, 45–51 (2007); Rankin 2016, supra note 8.
10
Those cities are: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lakewood, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Marysville,
Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup. Requests for records were submitted pursuant to Washington’s Public
Records Act, RCW §42.56 et seq., on January 29, 2018 and January 30, 2018.
11
See infra Part II, Section B(1).

II

tracked) “move-along” orders to extinguish the begging and push the visibly poor from public
spaces.12
Key findings of the enforcement data include:
•
•
•

•
•
•

Move-along orders may appear harmless, but they can still violate First Amendment
and due process rights.13
The fact that move-along orders do not generate a ticket or other trackable
evidence does not mean the laws are not being enforced. To the contrary, these
orders are pervasive enforcement tools that are not reported or tracked.14
Move-along orders commonly chill free speech and are vulnerable to discriminatory
use; however, those affected have no opportunity to challenge such orders and
advocates cannot track them.
Lakewood issued fifty-one citations under two anti-begging ordinances between
2013–2017.15
Lakewood severely punished these violations: 100% of individuals found guilty
received a 90-day jail sentence; 60% of individuals found guilty for begging in
restricted areas also received a fine ranging from $300–$500.16
Lakewood’s apparent lack of formal enforcement after 2016 suggests that the
Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Lakewood v. Willis, which held
provisions of Lakewood’s Restricted Areas17 ordinance unconstitutional,18 may have
triggered a dramatic shift in Lakewood's enforcement policies.

Key Case Studies
This brief also reviews several case studies of specific Washington ordinances.19 The
case studies reveal that many of these laws may not withstand judicial scrutiny under the
First Amendment.20

12

E.g., telephone Interview with Mark Solomon, Community Crime Prevention Specialist, Seattle Police Dep’t
(Sept. 26, 2017); Damon Pesanti, No Tickets Issued Under Centralia’s New Panhandling Ban, CHRONICLE (July 10,
2014), http://www.chronline.com/news/no-tickets-issued-under-centralia-s-new-panhandlingban/article_68f63e5a-085b-11e4-99fd-001a4bcf887a.html.
13
See infra Part II, Section (B)(2).
14
See, e.g., Christopher Herring, Dilara Yarbrough & Lisa Marie Alatorre, Pervasive Penalty: How the
Criminalization of Homelessness Perpetuates Poverty (forthcoming 2018).
15
Id.
16
Infra Part II, Section (B)(2).
17
Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A (2011).
18
City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Wash. 2016).
19
Infra Part III.
20
Id.

III

Key findings of the case studies include:
•

•
•

•

•

Lakewood has two ordinances21 that are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny
because they are overbroad content-based restrictions on speech. Both ordinances
restrict substantial speech in traditional public fora—a space afforded the greatest
First Amendment protections.22
Similarly, Des Moines has an ordinance prohibiting begging in public parks without
first obtaining a permit.23 The ordinance is overbroad.24
Issaquah prohibits begging on public property from sunset to sunrise.25 This law is
an overbroad restriction that prohibits substantial speech within a traditional public
forum.26 It is also vulnerable to a vagueness challenge based on the ambiguity of
the meaning of “sunset” and “sunrise.”27
Tacoma has two overlapping ordinances, one prohibiting coercive solicitation28 and
another prohibiting pedestrian interference.29 These laws effectively prohibit the
same behavior, except that coercive solicitation occurs only when an individual
blocks pedestrian traffic while making a solicitation.30 The penalty for coercive
solicitation is a gross misdemeanor, resulting in a higher fine and a higher possible
jail sentence than pedestrian interference.31
In other words, Tacoma punishes the same conduct more seriously if the offender is
begging, even peacefully. Peaceful begging is protected free speech; it should not
be punished as an aggravating factor.

Many Washington cities are unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge to their
anti-begging laws.32 Recent jurisprudence provides strong guidance for cities to consider in reevaluating their anti-begging laws. This brief recommends cities:33
▪
▪
▪
▪

Repeal ordinances that restrict peaceful begging;
Repeal aggressive begging ordinances and instead rely on existing ordinances to
address truly aggressive behavior;
Campaign for and invest in non-punitive solutions to address poverty; and
Recognize begging as a plea for help protected by the United States Constitution.

21

Lakewood MC §§ 9A.04.020A (2011) & 9A.05.050 (2010).
Infra Part III, Section (B)(2).
23
Des Moines MC § 19.08.030(7) (1988).
24
Infra Part III, Section (A)(2).
25
Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008).
26
Infra Part III, Section (B).
27
Id.
28
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007).
29
Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991).
30
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007).
31
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.060 (2007).
32
Id.
33
Infra Part IV.
22

IV

Many cities that restrict begging are infringing on the constitutional rights of their most
vulnerable residents and are contributing to the cycle of poverty and homelessness. But cities
play a crucial role in protecting the constitutional rights of all of their residents, and they can be
essential advocates in addressing the issues surrounding homelessness.

V

INTRODUCTION
The greatest misunderstanding about so-called ‘panhandling’ is about what it actually is.
It is one citizen asking another citizen for help. It’s that basic.34
The freedom of speech is one of the most cherished constitutional rights throughout
American history, but this right is routinely denied to visibly poor people with dire
consequences.35 Nationally, cities are increasingly criminalizing life-sustaining behavior,
infringing on the constitutional rights of individuals experiencing homelessness.36 Similarly,
municipalities are increasingly drafting laws that criminalize begging, purporting to justify such
laws as necessary public health and safety measures.37

First
Amendment
Violations

Due Process
Violations

Prohibit
Peaceful
Behavior

Continue Cycle of
Homelessness

Research has also shown that local
municipalities are widely embracing antibegging laws across the country.38 For
example, as of 2017, laws prohibiting
begging citywide have increased by 43%
since 2006, and laws that prohibit begging
in particular public spaces have increased by
7%.39 The increasing popularity of these
restrictions is troubling because they
suffocate the First Amendment rights of
vulnerable populations and strip away the
constitutional right to due process. These
begging restrictions further prohibit
constitutionally protected behavior and
have serious consequences that continue
the cycle of homelessness.

Problems with Begging Restrictions
34

Teresa Wiltz, Anti-Panhandling Laws Spread, Face Legal Challenges, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter Wiltz 2015] (quoting Ken Paulson, President of FIRST AMEND. CTR),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/11/12/anti-panhandling-laws-spreadface-legal-challenges.
35
See generally NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 9 (discussing “why laws criminally or civilly punishing
homeless persons’ life-sustaining activity are ineffective . . . and how they often violate homeless persons’
constitutional and human rights”).
36
Id. at 11.
37
Justin Olson & Scott MacDonald, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, WASHINGTON’S WAR ON
THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES & THEIR ENFORCEMENT 5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015)
(emphasizing that municipalities are increasingly enacting ordinances that criminalize homelessness for the
purported purpose of maintaining “health, safety, or general public order”).
38
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2.
39
Id.

1

Yet, there is no harm directly associated with begging alone.40 Courts have recognized
begging as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment,41 involving many speech
interests including “the communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.”42 But policymakers often perceive even peaceful
begging as a problem because it is a visual reminder of homelessness or human desperation
that makes people uncomfortable.43 Whether done consciously or unconsciously, the
criminalization of visible poverty is well documented.44
Between 2017 and 2018, HRAP examined the municipal codes of sixty-four cities within
Washington State to understand the scope and consequences of begging restrictions,45 the
most extensive survey of its kind in the nation. This brief finds that, despite begging being a
constitutionally protected form of speech, Washington cities have employed many techniques
to curb even peaceful requests for help while attempting to avoid First Amendment scrutiny.
The study revealed 121 ordinances that can be organized into four distinct categories of
restrictions: geographical, distance, time, and manner restrictions.

Four Types of Begging Restrictions
Types of

Restrictions
Geographical

Distance

Time

Manner

Particularly, cities have learned to manipulate geography by creating buffer zones
around specific public spaces where begging is illegal or by implementing specific distance
restrictions from areas like crosswalks, intersections, and entrances to buildings.46 Cities also
40

Telephone Interview with Nancy Talner, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Wash. (Oct. 3, 2017).
Neidig, supra note 1.
42
Megan Smith, Note, The Constitutionality of Panhandling Ordinances: Making “Cents” out of Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 35 J.L. & COM. 255, 257 (2017) (citing Schaumbuxg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 44 U.S. 620, 629 (1980)).
43
Talner, supra note 40.
44
HRAP, supra note 6.
45
The term “begging restrictions” is interchangeable throughout this brief with the term “anti-begging laws” or
“anti-begging ordinances.”
46
Rankin 2016, supra note 8 (writing that “city and state governments ‘have learned to manipulate geography in a
manner that now seriously threatens basic First Amendment principles’” (quoting Timothy Zick, Speech and
Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 584, 585 (2006))); id. at 33 n.168 (“Political dissent has become spatial tactics’
principal casualty.” (quoting Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. at 589–90))).
41
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implement time restrictions on begging wherein speech is prohibited between specific hours of
the day.47 Finally, cities implement manner restrictions in the form of aggressive begging
ordinances, which purport to prohibit threatening and aggressive behavior but often prohibit
peaceful harmless speech.48 To avoid heightened scrutiny, municipalities have broadly drafted
these laws in an attempt to mitigate First Amendment jurisprudence, while still imposing
burdensome limitations on protected speech.49
It strains credibility to suggest that these laws target anyone apart from the visible poor
or people experiencing homelessness. Just as importantly, these laws are unnecessary because
they frequently overlap with existing laws applicable to the population at large.50 For example,
objectively aggressive behavior is already prohibited by criminal laws such as harassment and
assault.51 Yet aggressive begging ordinances are the second most common form of begging
restrictions throughout Washington.52 Moreover, the majority of aggressive begging laws
hinge on subjective perceptions of the person being solicited for help—for example, a person
might be guilty of aggressive begging if someone listening to them feels intimidated,
regardless of the means and manner of the solicitation.53
Perception-based begging restrictions are
Aggressive begging
particularly problematic because studies show that many
55
ordinances often outlaw
people are deeply afraid of visibly poor people.
Neurological tests show exposure to a person bearing
peaceful and nonintrusive
some hallmark of homelessness can “[elicit] the worst
behavior protected by the
kind of prejudice – disgust and contempt” in those who
First Amendment.54
56
witness it. These studies highlight the critical flaw in
anti-begging laws rooted in the reaction of bystanders.
Few people are put in a state of fear when approached by a volunteer with a clipboard seeking
donations for a social initiative; yet, a similar interaction committed by a visibly poor person
can cause dramatically negative reactions. While these laws are frequently adopted “in a
47

E.g., Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008); see, e.g., Jessica So, Scott MacDonald, Justin Olson & Ryan Mansell, Seattle
University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, LIVING AT THE INTERSECTION: LAWS & VEHICLE RESIDENCY 5 (Sara
Rankin ed. 2016) (asserting that laws restricting the parking of cars between 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. are used to
push vehicle residents out of neighborhoods).
48
Infra Part III, Section D.
49
Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 34 (citing Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 59 (2015)).
50
See infra Part I, Section C.
51
Id.
52
Infra Part II (data on file with author).
53
Id.
54
Silverstein, supra note 3; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
55
Sara K. Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution), 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 383, 390 (2015) [hereinafter Rankin
2015] (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging Responses to
Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006)).
56
Id.; see also Harris & Fiske, supra note 9 (noting that study participants react with “disgust” to images of homeless
people).

3

purported effort to outlaw intimidating, threatening, and aggressive conduct," more often
than not they threaten peaceful behavior for the sake of deeply rooted systemic discomfort
directed at visible poverty.57 Additionally, between vague aggressive begging restrictions and
broad time and place restrictions, citizens often have no realistic way of knowing how to
conform their behavior to the confines of the law. The end result is that protected speech—the
right to simply ask for help—is savagely curtailed under the law.58
This brief is organized into three parts. Part I overviews First Amendment and due
process law often disregarded by these begging restrictions; Part II discusses the
criminalization of begging in Washington, covering new data regarding anti-begging laws
across the state; and Part III analyzes select begging restrictions in Washington to consider
whether these laws would withstand judicial scrutiny. This brief concludes with
recommendations for more compassionate, lawful, and effective approaches to begging.

An Overview of the Law
The Criminalization of Begging in Washington
Case Studies: Washington’s Restrictions on Begging
Recommendations

57
58

Silverstein, supra note 3; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 33–35.

4

PART I: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW
A basic tenet of First Amendment law is that the government cannot restrict speech
because it disagrees with who the speaker is or what the speaker is saying.61 However, the law
permits "content-neutral" time, place, and manner restrictions.62 It is within this narrow
content-neutral exception that cities attempt to draft their anti-begging ordinances.

The very nature of begging restrictions prohibit an
individual from asking another for help.59

60

Although anti-begging ordinances disproportionately violate the constitutional rights of
people experiencing homelessness, the public rarely views these laws as discriminatory.63 This
blind spot exists, in part, because of the deeply-rooted human instinct to avoid evidence of
poverty and human desperation.64 Studies show that people react to visible evidence of
poverty with uneasiness, disgust, and fear.65 Due to the public’s aversion to visible poverty,
local governments work to purge visible poverty from public spaces—regardless of whether
59

Infra Part I, Section B.
Photograph by Steve Baker, FLICKR CREATIVE COMMONS (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.flickr.com/photos/littlebiglens/26682208695/in/photostream/.
61
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
62
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
63
See generally NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 21 (2014) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014],
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place.
64
See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (1st ed.
2013) (discussing blind-spots as phenomenon of unconscious bias).
65
Rankin 2015, supra note 55 (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low:
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006).
60

5

discriminatory and unconstitutional effects are intended. When these restrictions prevent
individuals from asking for help or obstruct their access to due process of the law they can
trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.66 These popular anti-begging ordinances target visibly
poor individuals, and courts are increasingly striking down anti-begging ordinances as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.67
A. Stigmatizing and Criminalizing Visible Poverty
If history teaches us anything, it is that distinguishing between
the worthy and unworthy poor never withstands the test of time.68
Laws that restrict peaceful begging are among many forms of criminalization
influenced by unconscious biases against visible poverty.69 Criminalization laws are often
fueled by stereotypes that poor people are to blame for their circumstances.70 Although an
estimated 20% of people experiencing homelessness actually work,71 anti-begging laws
encourage the stereotype that people experiencing homelessness are lazy and inferior to
housed individuals.72 Anti-begging ordinances are further fueled by the notion that giving
money to people experiencing homelessness “enables addicts and prevents them from

66

E.g., Speet v. Schute, 726 F.3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 551 (4th
Cir. 2013); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000); Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t., 999 F.2d 699,
704 (2d Cir. 1993); Wiltz 2015, supra note 34; see also Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 17 (citing United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990)) (stating that “[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the
First Amendment”).
67
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 197 (D. Mass. 2015) (finding Lowell’s downtown begging and
aggressive begging restrictions unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F.
Supp. 3d 218, 233–34, 237–38 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting the failure of similar aggressive begging ordinances to survive
strict scrutiny); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173, (2016)
(finding anti-panhandling law to be a form of content discrimination); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp.
1276, 1292 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (holding that aggressive begging ordinance was not necessary to serve
important interest of public safety); City of Lakewood v. Willis, 37 P.3d 1056 (Wash. 2016) (holding that two
provisions of anti-begging ordinance imposed “content-based speech restrictions in a substantial number of
traditional public forums”).
68
PHILIPPE BOURGOIS & JEFF SCHONBERG, RIGHTEOUS DOPEFIEND 316 (2009).
69
Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 36 (“The increasing prevalence of anti-begging laws is a helpful example of how
unconscious biases against poor people and deep-rooted associations between visible poverty and danger can
become manifest in the law.”); see also HRAP, supra note 6.
70
Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 1.
71
THE U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS SURV.: A STAT. REP. ON HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S
CITIES (Dec. 2015), http://chicagohelpinitiative.org/assets/uploads/files/1221-report-hhreport.pdf (18% of
homeless people are employed).
72
Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 1.
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getting help” or from getting a job.73 The justice system often supports this view by upholding
laws that “push visibly poor people out of public space merely because visible evidence of
human desperation tends to undermine feelings of safety.”74 Despite these notions, many
people experiencing poverty are forced to beg because they have no reasonable alternative. A
study of panhandling in Toronto, Canada, found that 48% of panhandlers did not enjoy
panhandling because it was “degrading,” and 70% “would prefer a minimum-wage job,” but
thought they could not handle one “because of mental illness, physical disability, or lack of
skills.”75
Included in the discussion of
whether begging should be protected is
how the stereotypes surrounding
homelessness impact both the law and the
level of tolerance and empathy from the
community. This discussion is related to
the stereotypes and unconscious biases
discussed above, but it is often focused on
individuals who give to panhandlers do not
know how their money will be spent. One
study in San Francisco found data that
76
suggests that the funds donated to
panhandlers are most often used for “good” purposes.77 For example, the study found that

73

Wiltz 2015, supra note 34. But see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2 at 32 (estimating that “44% of all homeless
people are employed on a temporary or full-time basis”); U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS SURV.,
supra note 71. See Aaron Burkhalter, Signs of the Times, REAL CHANGE (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://realchangenews.org/2013/12/19/signs-times (explaining how cities, like Aberdeen, discourage people from
giving donations to panhandlers by erecting signs that display “Keep the change. Don’t support panhandling. The
majority of your change goes to Drugs & Alcohol. Help more by giving to charity.”). But see JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE
POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) (quashing persistent “myths” that homeless people are
“somehow responsible for their own poverty” by explaining that “[once] we acknowledge . . . drugs, alcoholism, or
mental illness . . . are not sufficient explanations of homelessness, we can begin to explore the real causes”);
Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Celine Bellot, Challenging Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada,
in ADVANCING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 1, 7 (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., Irwin Law 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484975 (explaining how “prejudice and stereotypes obscure the social, economic, and
political causes of homelessness and thwart efforts to address these underlying factors by blaming those who are
its victims, imputing personal characteristics of moral inferiority, laziness, dishonesty, and criminality which, in
turn, provide an ‘explanation’ for the problem of homelessness”).
74
Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 25 (citing Beckett & Herbert, supra note 65, at 21 (quotation omitted)).
75
Rohit Bose & Stephen W. Hwang, Income and Spending Patterns Among Panhandlers, 167(5) CMAJ 477-479
(2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC121964/. Interestingly, 43% of participants relayed that
they did enjoy panhandling because of the opportunity to “meet people,” while 9% were undecided. Id.
76
Heather Knight, The City’s Panhandlers Tell Their Own Stories, SF GATE (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/The-city-s-panhandlers-tell-their-own-stories-4929388.php.
77
Id.
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94% of the money donated to panhandlers was used for food, and in contrast, only 44% of
individuals used some of the money donated for drugs and/or alcohol.78
Such stereotypes are often advanced by business owners who complain about visible
poverty in the local business districts and lobby for criminalization of homelessness.79
Businesses frequently argue that the presence of visibly poor people scares away customers,
especially when begging occurs.80 For many business owners “[t]he hope is simply that if
homeless people can be made to disappear, nothing will stand in the way of realizing the
dream of prosperity, social harmony, and perpetual economic growth.”81 However, both
business owners and members of the public fail to realize that absent employment or family
support, begging may be a person’s “best option for obtaining the money that they need to
purchase food, public transportation fare, medication, or other necessities.”82
These stereotypes become especially harmful when cities publicly advance and
reinforce them. For example, Arlington and Marysville recently joined to create a flier that
identifies panhandling as a problem and urges individuals to keep their “wallet closed” when
approached by panhandlers because “you can’t know how it will be spent.”83 The flier identifies
panhandling as a problem that “adversely impacts our cities’ and neighborhoods’ images, local
businesses, and perception of public safety.”84

78

Id.
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 31, 32; Joe Palazzolo & Alejandro Lazo, Denver’s Bus’s Take Active Role in
Homeless Policies, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/denvers-businesses-take-active-rolein-homeless-policies-1476639643 (explaining Denver’s business community successfully advocated for “homeless
parking meter installations” which “encouraged people to feed parking meters that collected money for charity,
rather than give to the homeless directly”).
80
See Theresa Wiltz, Do New Laws Help or Hurt the Homeless? PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter
Wiltz 2014], http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/11/17/do-new-laws-help-orhurt-the-homelessness.
81
Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United
States, RADICAL J. GEOGRAPHY 303, 307 (1997), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8330.00048/epdf.
82
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 25.
83
City of Arlington & City of Marysville, This Community Cares,
http://www.arlingtonwa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/918 (retrieved Oct. 17, 2017).
84
Id.
79
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Harmful stereotypes in action: flier distributed by Arlington and Marysville.85

A common theme propelled by proponents of anti-begging ordinances is that they
overestimate how feasible it is for individuals experiencing homelessness to find and maintain
employment. Immutable characteristics and uncontrollable circumstances, including mental
illness, addiction, single parenthood, lack of hygiene facilities, lack of sleep,86 and evidence of a
criminal record for engaging in life-sustaining activities can make it difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain an adequate job.87 Potential employers often hesitate when they see that an
applicant has no permanent mailing address or reliable ability to maintain his or her hygiene.88

85

Id. The flier has been cropped for purposes of implementation into this brief. The entire flier is found in the
appendix of this brief. Infra Appendix, Part I.
86
NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 43 (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR. 2009], http://timefolds.com/nch/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/CrimzReport_2009.pdf (explaining how prohibitions on overnight sleeping force people
experiencing homelessness to “stay up at night and sleep during the day, making it even more difficult for them to
find employment”); see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 24.
87
See Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?,
27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 261–66 (1994) (internal citations omitted); NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 13, 24, 30,
36, 38; LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373, 374 (2000) (explaining how “[m]entally ill
offenders are often inextricably trapped in a ‘revolving door’ of petty crime, incarceration, release, homelessness,
and re-imprisonment”).
88
See Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 106CV-1445, 2006 WL 3542732, at *40 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006). Irreparable
harm results from these city-sanctioned practices, including “harm to homeless people's security and dignity.” Id.
For example, people experiencing homelessness “lose medicine and health supplies; tents and bedding that
shelter them from the elements; clothing and hygiene supplies; identification documents and other personal
papers; the tools by which they try to make a meager income; and items of immeasurable sentimental value.” Id.
Without important identification documents, medication, clothing, and hygiene supplies, people experiencing
homelessness are further hindered from finding and maintaining adequate employment.
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Putting aside individual responses to begging, cities should resist criminalization.
Criminalizing begging can exacerbate homelessness and make it more difficult for people to
escape. Once saddled with a criminal record, people experiencing homelessness are further
hindered from accessing employment, housing, and public benefits.89 Instead of exacerbating
this cycle, municipalities should address the underlying problems of people experiencing
homelessness, such as inadequate mental health and housing benefits.90 The cyclical nature of
criminalizing homelessness is costly for taxpayers because people experiencing homelessness
are consistently cycled through the criminal justice system when non-punitive alternatives,
such as affordable housing, are pragmatically and economically more effective solutions.91

People react
to visible
poverty with
fear.

Fear fuels
biases and
stereotypes.

The cycle of
homelessness
continues.

Cities implement
begging
restrictions.

Individuals
violate these
restrictions.

89

Drew Sena, Note, A Constitutional Critique on the Criminalization of Panhandling in Washington State, 41 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 287, 289 (2017).
90
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 45.
91
Id. at 34 (stating that “costs resulting from criminalization measures are present at multiple stages of the
criminal justice process,” and people experiencing homelessness are often unable to pay, which results in
increased jail time, suspension of their driver’s license, and poor credit); Josh Howard & David Tran, Seattle
University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, AT WHAT COST: THE MINIMUM COST OF CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS
IN SEATTLE & SPOKANE (Sara K. Rankin ed. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602530. See generally Ariel Schreiber &
Becca Butler-Dines, Too High a Price What Criminalizing Homelessness Costs Colorado: Denver City Spotlight,
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/homeless-advocacy-policy-project/2-16-16-Final-Report.pdf (accessed on
Feb. 3, 2018).
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Regardless of studies that challenge stereotypes surrounding homelessness, the debate
over whether to give to panhandlers is a futile conversation. All individuals value essential
freedoms of autonomy and independence. “People have the right to be free agents . . . and
limitations on their choice must be justified
in terms of protecting their rights or the
“[Pope Francis] said that giving
rights of others.”93 The “dilemma” of
something to someone in need
whether to give money to someone asking
is ‘always right’. . . But what if
for help because that person might use the
money as they choose should give us pause.
someone uses the money for,
The real dilemma should not center on
say, a glass of wine?”
passing judgment or how to limit the
freedom and choices of others; instead, it
“His answer: If ‘a glass of wine is the
should focus on how each of us will respond
only happiness he has in life, that’s
to another human being’s request for help.

O.K. Instead, ask yourself, what do
you do on the sly? What happiness do
you seek in secret?’”
“Another way to look at it, he said, is
to recognize how you are the ‘luckier’
one, with a home, a spouse and
children, and then ask why your
responsibility to help should be
pushed onto someone else.” 92

And regardless of how anyone feels
about homelessness “public intolerance or
animosity cannot be the basis for
abridgment of . . .constitutional freedoms.”94
Cities may not enact laws that contain “an
obvious invitation to discriminatory
enforcement against those whose
association together is ‘annoying’ because
their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical
appearance is resented by the majority of
their fellow citizens.”95

B. Begging for Free Speech
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.96
Laws that prohibit or limit an individual’s First Amendment right to ask for help are
subject to significant constitutional challenges. It is central to the First Amendment that in

92

The Editorial Board, Opinion, The Pope on Panhandling: Give Without Worry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/opinion/the-pope-on-panhandling-give-without-worry.html?_r=0.
93
BARRY JAY SELTSER & DONALD EARL MILLER, HOMELESS FAMILIES: THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY 107 (1993).
94
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
95
Id. at 616; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (demanding a greater degree of specificity when “a
statute’s literal scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”).
96
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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public fora,97 people “might be ‘confronted with an uncomfortable message’ that they cannot
avoid.”98 Indeed, the First Amendment seeks to protect speech that others find disagreeable,
uncomfortable, or even offensive.99 And yet, because others find even peaceful requests for
help to be distasteful or uncomfortable, cities all over the country effectively block visibly poor
people from exercising their First Amendment rights.
Anti-begging laws create hurdles that people experiencing homelessness are unlikely to
overcome. Time and place restrictions on begging create invisible, irregular, and expanding
patchworks of permissible and impermissible zones where begging may not occur—such as
laws restricting begging after dark100 or begging near crosswalks and intersections.101
The U.S. Supreme Court recently made it
tougher for cities to restrict begging. The First
Amendment prohibits the restriction of speech
The First
Ideas
based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
Amendment
or its content.”103 In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the
prohibits the
restriction of
Supreme Court clarified that courts must
Subject
speech based on
Matter
determine whether a law is content-based “on its
its:
face” or content-neutral before determining
whether the purported “purpose and justifications
Content
for the law are content-based.”104 This test means
102
that courts must evaluate the plain language of a
law to determine whether it targets a particular
message or purpose before considering any purported justifications for the law. As a result, a
court can determine that a law is unconstitutional based on the language of the law alone. If
the law regulates speech based on the speaker’s message or the purpose for which the speaker
is communicating, the law is content based; content-neutral justifications or rationales will not
change this fact.105
Message

Reed is also significant because it clarified which speech restrictions are content-based.
Since Reed, content-based restrictions include not only laws that regulate a speaker’s specific
message, but also laws that regulate speech based on its “function or purpose.” 106 Put another
way, a law is content-based if an officer must evaluate what the speaker is communicating to
determine whether her speech is restricted.107 In contrast, a law is content-neutral if it
regulates an individual’s ability to speak in public without referencing the specific message the
individual is communicating.108
Courts should now presume that explicit antibegging laws are content-based.110 The very nature of
anti-begging laws prohibit an individual from conveying
their message of needing help. Whatever the manner a
person asks for help, the act of panhandling itself is a
form of expressive communication,111 and content-based
anti-begging laws endanger the “right to engage fellow

Courts should presume
that explicit anti-begging
laws are content-based
and subject to strict
scrutiny.109
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human beings with the hope of receiving aid and compassion.”112 These laws impermissibly
filter speech based on the message communicated because they require authorities to
“examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether a violation has
occurred.”113 Put differently, these laws do not prohibit all speech in certain places or at certain
times; they prohibit certain contents of speech.
Classifications of laws as either content-neutral or content-based have already led to
markedly different outcomes in begging cases.114 If a law is content-based it is subject to strict
97

“Public foras are places that have been “held out for general use by the public for speech-related purposes.”
What is a Public Forum?, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017),
http://www.firstamendmentschools.org/freedoms/faq.aspx?id=13012. Traditional public forums consist of
sidewalks, street corners, and public parks. Id.
98
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (2015) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529
(2014)).
99
Rankin 2016, supra note 8.
100
See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.18.050(E) (2002); Centralia MC § 10.37.040 (2014); Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008);
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010); Marysville MC § 6.37.045 (2014); Monroe MC § 9.35.040 (2008); Sunnyside MC
§ 9.86.050(E) (1978).
101
See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(6)(b) (2002) (unlawful to beg “at an intersection controlled by lighted traffic
signals, where that activity is between or involves a person or persons located in a sidewalk or along a public
roadway and a person or persons in or on a vehicle traveling on a public roadway”) (emphasis added); Sunnyside
MC § 9.86.050(B) (1978) (“unlawful to beg “within 10 feet of any marked pedestrian crosswalk, within 10 feet of
any entrance or exit of any building then in use by the general public, or from the area of any sidewalk within 10
feet of its intersection with an alley or publicly used driveway”).
102
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972)).
103
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
104
Id. at 2228 (noting that the appellate court skipped this “crucial first step”) (clarifying that “strict scrutiny applies
either when a law is content-based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content-based,”
and mandating that courts “evaluate each question” before concluding the law is content-neutral).
105
See id. at 2227.
106
Id. (clarifying that content-based laws include those that regulate the actual content of the message as well as
laws that are “more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose”).
107
See id. at 2226-27; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (explaining that
“laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference
reflects a content preference”).
108
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2223.
109
See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016) (finding a Lakewood begging ordinance to be
content-based under Reed and joining “the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed similar antibegging laws after Reed”).
110
See id. The assertion that anti-begging laws are presumed to be content-based applies only to laws that
specifically target begging, not laws that broadly target all types of speech.
111
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (2015).
112
Id. (citing Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 424 Mass. 918, 679 (1997)).
113
Id. (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014)).
114
Compare Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding two anti-begging ordinances as
content-neutral and serving legitimate government interests), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887, with Thayer v. City of
Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233, 238 (D. Mass. 2015) (in light of Reed, finding same ordinances as content-based
and unable to withstand strict scrutiny).
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scrutiny—the highest and most exacting level of judicial scrutiny a court can apply—“regardless
of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the
idea contained’ in the regulated speech.”115 Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove
that the law serves a compelling interest and is narrowly designed to achieve that interest.116
On the other hand, if a law is content-neutral, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny—
meaning the law is more likely to survive judicial review. Normally, to withstand intermediate
scrutiny, the State must prove that the law furthers an important government interest by
means that are “substantially related” to that interest.117 However, the Washington State
Constitution includes more stringent free speech protections that require content-neutral
restrictions to serve a compelling government interest.118 Essentially, in Washington those
content-neutral laws must be aimed at achieving a compelling government interest, which is
the same standard applied to content-based laws under strict scrutiny.

Strict Scrutiny

Intermediate Scrutiny119

Applies to content-based laws.

Applies to content-neutral laws.

State must prove the law is
narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.

State must prove the law is
substantially related to a
compelling government
interest.120

115

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015); see also Telephone interview with Sarah Wunsch, Deputy
Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. (Feb. 26, 2016) (emphasizing that the government’s motive is
irrelevant to the content-neutrality analysis).
116
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218 (2015).
117
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, WEX, INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
118
Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154, 163(1997) (citing Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)).
119
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 117 .
120
The Washington Supreme Court has raised the standard for content-neutral laws based on the State
constitution. Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (holding “[w]e diverge from the Supreme
Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, ‘as we believe restrictions on speech can
be imposed consistent with [the State constitution] only upon a showing a compelling state interest.’” (quoting
Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 931 (Wash. 1986))).
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Cities can no longer simply invoke phrases such as “public safety” or “public health” as
justifications for begging restrictions unless the cities can prove a clear link between the
begging restriction and the specific way the restriction serves the purported interest.121 In
other words, the city bears the burden of demonstrating that its justifications for regulating
begging are not mere pretext for suppressing requests for help.122 To meet this burden, the city
must show that the harms it seeks to mitigate are real and that “the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a material way.”123
These justifications must be genuine and supported by a strong basis of “meaningful
evidence-based data” rather than “shoddy data”124 that is “hypothesized or invented post hoc
in response to litigation.”125 Thus, Reed is a promising tool to fight unreasonable begging
restrictions.126
Consider one example of laws that commonly
control who can speak and where they can speak: laws
that require permits for begging.128 Requiring a permit to
engage in protected speech is “a dramatic departure from
our national heritage and constitutional tradition.”129
Because these laws require the speaker to obtain a permit
before speaking, courts may classify the laws as creating a
130
prior restraint on speech. A prior restraint exists when speech is “conditioned on the prior
approval of public officials.”131 Prior restraints are problematic because they carry the risk of
the government officials censoring speech based on a whim; thus, permit requirements often
risk suppressing speech based on the content or the identity of the speaker.132 Any system of
prior restraint carries “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”133

Cities must justify their
anti-begging ordinances
with “meaningful
evidence-based data.”127

121

See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014) (“A narrowly tailored law will have a “close fit between
ends and means”); McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (noting that protecting public safety and preventing
coercion may constitute compelling governmental interests insofar as “the legislature has a strong basis in
evidence to support that justification” (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996))).
122
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994); see also McLaughlin v. City of
Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 188 n.7.
123
Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 624.
124
McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 187 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)).
125
Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
126
See Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 37–38.
127
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 187 (D. Mass. 2015) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)).
128
E.g., Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010). See Part III for a detailed discussion of these permitting requirements.
129
Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002).
130
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
131
State v. Dean, 866 N.E.2d 1134, 1143 (1st Cir. 2007).
132
Id.
133
Carroll v. Pres. & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
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Even content-neutral permitting laws must meet certain criteria to overcome this
presumption.134 If a permitting law regulates when, where, or how individuals may speak in
public, the law must: (1) not give overly broad discretion to government officials; (2) not
regulate the content of one’s speech; and (3) leave alternative means of communication open
to those whose speech is affected.135 Municipalities can regulate some speech activities
through permits,136 but permitting laws must be narrowly tailored.137
A narrowly tailored law does not “burden
substantially more speech than is necessary” to
“[I]t is offensive—not only to the
achieve the compelling government interest
values protected by the First
motivating the law.139 The city bears this burden
Amendment, but to the very
by showing it is using the least restrictive means
notion of a free society—
to further its interest.140 Cities fail to meet this
that in the context of everyday
burden when reasonable alternatives exist to
public discourse, a citizen must
address the issue at hand. For example, in Blitch
first inform the government of
v. City of Slidwell, the city passed a contenther desire to speak to her
based ordinance that required panhandlers to
register with the police and to wear identification
neighbors and then obtain a
before asking others for a monetary donation.141
permit to do so.”138
The city argued that the law was necessary to
enforce its current aggressive begging laws.142 The plaintiffs, three individuals that panhandled
in Slidell, filed a suit alleging that the ordinance violated the First Amendment.143 The district
court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment
because it was a prior restraint on protected speech not narrowly tailored to meet the city’s
public safety interests.144 The court found there were less restrictive, alternative means the city
could pursue in achieving its enforcement interest.145 Rather than unnecessarily burdening
protected speech, the city could allocate police resources to enforce already existing

134

See Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 129–30 (“Public fora have achieved a special status in law; the government
must bear an extraordinarily heavy burden to regulate speech in such locales.”)
135
Id. at 130–31.
136
See, e.g., Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 576 (1941) (parade permitting scheme upheld as
regulating time, place, and manner rather than speech).
137
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130.
138
Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New
York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002)).
139
Id. (citing to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
140
Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656 (E.D. Louisiana, 2017).
141
Id. at 659.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 660.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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ordinances against aggressive panhandling or install cameras at frequently used locations to
identify aggressive panhandlers.146
C. Begging for Due Process
The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government.147
Besides free speech concerns, anti-begging laws may violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.148 The Constitution requires that no individual “be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.”149 Essentially, due process prohibits
cities from “arbitrarily or unfairly depriving individuals of their basic constitutional rights.”150
Due process issues arise when anti-begging laws allow for discriminatory enforcement, when
overlapping laws have differing penalties, and when violations of aggressive begging laws are
determined only by the subjective perception of the witness and not on some objectively
aggressive conduct.
First, specificity of the law is important
for protecting individuals experiencing
homelessness because vague laws allow for
discriminatory enforcement against
marginalized and disfavored groups.151 When a
law regulates expression protected by the First
Amendment, courts require legislatures to set
specific and clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.152 To survive

Due Process Concerns arise with:
Vague laws
Overlapping ordinances
Subjective standards

146

Id.
Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 588 (1974).
148
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1453–54 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996),
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh'g and
reh'g en banc (Sept. 17, 1996), and aff'd, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc
(Sept. 17, 1996) (invalidating a section of aggressive begging ordinance which prescribed circumstances to be
considered in determining a beggar's intent as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).
149
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § I.
150
Due Process of Law, FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/due+process+of+law (last
visited Nov. 29, 2017).
151
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971); see also Javier Ortiz & Matthew Dick, Seattle University
Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, THE WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY: A COMPARISON OF MODERN & HISTORICAL
CRIMINALIZATION LAWS 17 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) (describing America’s disturbing heritage of using vague laws as
an “effective tool for the removal of unwanted people from public space because of the broad discretion the
officers were granted by the wording of the statute”).
152
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (requiring a greater degree of specificity when “a statute’s literal scope
. . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”).
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judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, an ordinance must provide a person of
ordinary intelligence notice of what conduct is prohibited, and the criminalized behavior must
not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.153 Thus, an ordinance violates
the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to clearly define the prohibited conduct in a manner that
would allow for relatively uniform, rather than arbitrary, enforcement.154
Anti-begging ordinances are susceptible to due process concerns. The laws target a
particular form of speech; they deal with solicitation and panhandling specifically, as opposed
to all speech generally. Perhaps an aggressive begging ordinance that targets all form of
speech is, in fact, a law against harassment.
Not surprisingly, courts have increasingly scrutinized anti-begging ordinances with
great care in recent years, routinely striking those laws written with vague restrictions devoid
of objective criteria.155 Without such judicial oversight, laws may allow for unfettered
discretion and virtually unrestrained powers to arrest, which is offensive to constitutional
freedoms.156
Discriminatory enforcement of marginalized groups is also evident in how individuals
experiencing homelessness and the act of begging are often portrayed in the media. For
example, a woman who panhandled to raise money for school supplies received praise from
her community,157 while a man who panhandled for his basic needs was regarded with
contempt and was perceived by others as a wrongdoer.158 These two contrasting stories
illustrate the problem with discriminatory enforcement. Who is more likely to be cited for their
behavior? The teacher panhandling for school supplies or the individual panhandling for his
most basic of needs?

153

Webster, 802 P.2d at 1338.
Id.
155
Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 54 (explaining how “common reactions to visible poverty—discomfort, unease,
disgust, and anxiety—fuel the urge to exile” people experiencing homelessness from public space).
156
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465–67 (1987) (“Although we appreciate the difficulties of drafting precise
laws, we have repeatedly invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for
words or conduct that annoy or offend them.”); see also Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129
(1992) (holding invalid laws delegating “overly broad discretion to the decision maker”).
157
See, e.g., Katie Kindelan, Oklahoma Teacher Panhandles to Raise Money for School Supplies, ABC NEWS (July 25,
2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/oklahoma-teacher-panhandles-raise-money-schoolsupplies/story?id=48815271; Noe Hernandez, Panhandling Mom Raises §10K for Daughter’s College, Ends Tuition
Quest to Return to Work, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2017/08/28/mom-begs-college-tuition/609384001/.
158
See Mark Johnson, American Fork Places Barriers to Block Panhandlers, DAILY HERALD (May 8, 2013),
http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/north/american-fork/american-fork-places-barriers-to-blockpanhandlers/article_8348fdb4-3092-5e98-aaa3-f8006ca34f99.html; see also Steve DeVane, Council Members
Suggest Fines for Giving to Panhandlers, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.fayobserver.com/news/20171031/council-members-suggest-fines-for-giving-to-panhandlers.
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Second, aggressive begging laws are often one of many overlapping ordinances with
differing penalties that cause both due process and equal protection concerns.161 Overlapping
ordinances criminalize the same behavior under two or more separate ordinances. When those
ordinances carry different penalties, discriminatory enforcement against particular classes of
individuals is inevitable.162 For example, aggressive begging ordinances may “hold homeless
individuals to a higher standard than existing assault or harassment laws, which often prohibit
the same conduct but are facially neutral.”163 Cities cannot deem one criminal activity worse
simply because it is conducted combined with constitutionally protected—albeit disfavored—
speech.164 When aggressive begging ordinances and existing assault or harassment laws have
different penalties, they may violate the right to due process; differing penalties for identical
conduct may “authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”165
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Kindelan, supra note 157.
Dion Lefler, New Wichita Law: You Could go to Jail for Giving Money to a Roadside Panhandler, WHICHITA EAGLE
(Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article189336969.html (writing that
“panhandlers and drivers who give them money could face stiff fines or even jail time under an ordinance
approved by the Wichita City Council”).
161
Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 7 (stating that at least “66% of [Washington] cities draft criminalization
ordinances in a way that either overlap with other ordinances or contain compound provisions that criminalize
multiple, and often unrelated, behaviors”). See infra Part III, Section (D) for an example of overlapping ordinances
in Washington.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 4, 17–28 (comparison of Seattle’s Pedestrian Interference ordinance and its Harassment ordinance reveals
that aggressive begging “is nothing more than harassment in the context of a poor person asking for money”).
164
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 193 (2015).
165
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 128 F. Supp. 3d 597, 618–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding no “comfort that the Town's safety officers will
use their discretion, or be ‘trained’ on how to determine whether a person is soliciting employment or attempting
to stop a vehicle to solicit employment” because “[s]uch discretion may surely invite discriminatory
enforcement”); Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 7.
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Third, due process concerns arise with aggressive begging laws specifically because of
how those laws shift the focus of culpability.166 Often, such laws are written so culpability is
based on the perception of the bystander rather than on the specific, objective conduct of the
individual asking for help. As a result, an individual can violate aggressive begging laws without
engaging in objectively aggressive behavior.167 For example, a person being asked to give
money might feel “compelled or fearful” yet cannot point to any objective conduct that the
speaker should have avoided. When culpability is based on the bystander’s perception, the
focus shifts from the conduct of the beggar to the bystander’s feelings, which are filtered
through the bystander’s own lens of prejudice and inherent bias.168 Thus, a person
experiencing homelessness may have no way to inform his or her conduct to fit the law—
simply asking for help may be a crime.
As a policy matter, these aggressive begging laws are
not appropriate because they cater to implicit and
An individual can
unconscious biases regarding visible poverty. When little or
violate aggressive
no guidance is provided about the objective conduct
begging laws without
prohibited, law enforcement is left to rely on subjective
engaging in objectively
perceptions: “whether that perception is judged as a
‘reasonable person’ feeling fearful or compelled or some
aggressive behavior.169
170
perceived manifestation of an ‘intent to intimidate.’” In
such circumstances, individuals exercising their
constitutional right to ask for help in public have no way of knowing “how to conform
themselves to the law” because there is no objective basis to determine when peaceful
requests for money might be perceived as threatening or intimidating.171

166

See infra Part III, pp. 63–65 for a more in-depth discussion on how due process concerns arise when culpability
is found in the subjective perception of the “victim.”
167
See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more
persons”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within fifty feet of any other
panhandler”).
168
Telephone Interview with Aaron Burkhalter, Editor at Real Change (Oct. 6, 2017).
169
See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more
persons”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within fifty feet of any other
panhandler”).
170
See Memorandum from Justin Olson to Professor Sara Rankin, Director of the Homeless Rights Advocacy
Project at Seattle University School of Law, Washington’s Panhandling Ordinances: Graphical Representations 2
(2017) [hereinafter Olson Memorandum] (reporting that 42% of the surveyed aggressive begging laws trigger
liability based on perception alone, 54%, contain both a conduct component as well as a perception component,
2% contain only conduct components, and 2% contain neither conduct nor perception based components).
Notably, 98% of aggressive begging ordinances contain a perception-based component. Id.
171
Wunsch, supra note 115.
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A common example reveals how
impractical and morally repugnant laws with a
A law must provide a person
subjective component can be. Under most of
notice of what conduct is
these laws, it is enough to trigger criminal liability
prohibited, and the prohibited
if a bystander feels fearful or compelled to
conduct must not be susceptible donate. Yet in cities throughout Washington, both
to arbitrary and discriminatory
volunteers and paid organizations will place
enforcement.172
representatives at street corners asking for
donations to one cause or another. Environmental
activists, political fundraisers, and champions of charitable causes may not make passersby
feel fearful, but they make bystanders feel compelled to give. Were these laws faithfully
applied, the examples above would be liable under the aggressive begging ordinances. Yet it is
not the clean-cut, college-aged activists at risk under these laws; it is the visibly poor who ask
for help, not out activism but out of necessity.

Recap of Applicable Law

▪ A legal presumption exists that anti-begging laws are content-based
laws.173

▪ Permitting laws targeting solicitation specifically are content-based
because they “target specific speech based on its communicative
intent.”174

▪ Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.175
▪ Cities must show that the permitting law is the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling interest. 176

▪ The law must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.177
▪ A content-neutral law must leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.178

▪ The city must supply meaningful evidence-based data to establish its
compelling interest.179

172

City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990).
See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063–64 (2016).
174
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395).
175
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 187 (2015).
176
Id. (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014)).
177
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
178
Id.
179
McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 187.
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PART II: FEW SAFE HAVENS
A. The Criminalization of Begging in Washington
Throughout Washington State, an overwhelming majority of cities have adopted
ordinances that curtail and criminalize the exercise of free speech in the form of begging. A
survey of sixty-four cities throughout Washington State found 121 anti-begging ordinances,180
indicating that cities continue to rely upon the criminal law as a response to disfavored speech
from marginalized groups. This section summarizes key findings drawn from the data collected
on those begging restrictions.
The majority of cities surveyed (86%) had at least one ordinance restricting begging in
some form.181 No clear pattern or common thread links the few cities that have no antibegging ordinances. The criminalization of begging is neither limited to one region over
another nor to large cities over small cities. There are few safe havens throughout Washington
and no way to predict whether a particular city will allow individuals to ask for help in public.
The graph below depicts the number of cities with anti-begging ordinances in their municipal
codes:182
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The complete survey data, current as of April 2018, is on file with the Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (HRAP)
at Seattle University School of Law [hereinafter Ordinance Chart].
181
The survey revealed that 55 of the 64 cities surveyed had at least one anti-begging restriction within their
municipal codes.
182
See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
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These ordinances restrict begging through many mechanisms.183 The data shows that
ordinances with zone or geographic restrictions are the most common method of
criminalization.184 The following graph depicts anti-begging ordinances in Washington State
sorted into four categories of common restrictions: geographic restrictions, distance
restrictions, time restrictions, and aggressive panhandling restrictions.185
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Beyond simply victimizing protected conduct, anti-begging ordinances also impose
severe penalties for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Proponents of homeless
criminalization laws commonly argue that the penalties are mere infractions carrying civil
(monetary) penalties—not criminal. These proponents claim no one ever faces the prospect of
183

Id.
Id.
185
Note that some cities have ordinances containing all four types of restrictions within one ordinance. For
example, a city may have an ordinance that prohibits begging within public parks, and also on sidewalks between
the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. This ordinance would be included in both the zone/geographic restriction
category and the time restriction category.
184
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jail time for camping in public spaces, sitting on sidewalks, or—in the case of this present
study—asking for help.186 But to the contrary, HRAP researchers discovered the opposite to be
true: the majority of anti-begging ordinances provide for misdemeanor penalties.
The chart below demonstrates the dramatic discrepancy between civil penalties and
criminal penalties for anti-begging ordinances:

Penalties for Begging Restrictions
Unknown, 2%
Infraction, 15%

Misdemeanor, 83%

Penalties for begging are severe: 83% of the surveyed begging ordinances are
misdemeanors, which means violators may incur a substantial fine and possible
incarceration.187 Moreover, the above chart does not account for ordinances with penalties
that transform infractions into misdemeanors.188 Of the remaining 15% listed as infractions,
half allow for a civil infraction to evolve into a misdemeanor—typically due to repeated
violations.189 Under these “progressive penalty” provisions, repeat violations of the same
conduct, such as asking for help again after receiving a negative response, may transform
some of those relatively few civil infractions into misdemeanors. Interestingly, some
misdemeanor ordinances themselves also contained progressive penalty provisions, providing
for enhanced fines and jail time because of multiple citations.190
186

See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37.
See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
188
See, e.g., Centralia MC § 10.37.060(A)–(C) (2014) (increasing penalties for multiple offenses: “Class 1 civil
infraction with the maximum assessment not to exceed . . . two hundred fifty dollars” for first offense; “misdemeanor
. . . subject to a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars . . . and/or imprisonment not to exceed ninety days” for
second offense; and “gross misdemeanor” punishable by a fine “not to exceed five thousand dollars . . . and/or
imprisonment not to exceed three hundred and sixty-five days” for third offense (emphasis added)).
189
See Olson Memorandum, supra note 170, at 5.
190
See, e.g., Port Angeles MC § 12.04.130 (2016) (first offense punishable “by a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment
for up to thirty days, or both,” second offense punishable “by a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to
ninety days, or both,” and third and subsequent offenses punishable “by a fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment
for up to one year, or both”); see also Arlington MC § 9.56.080(1)–(3) (2014).
187
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As depicted above, misdemeanor ordinances drastically outnumber infraction
ordinances for every category of restrictions HRAP researchers identified. Specifically, 77% of
violations of geographic restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 20% result in an
infraction; 90% of violations of distance restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 3%
result in an infraction; 75% of violations of time restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while 25%
result in an infraction; and 94% of violations of manner restrictions result in a misdemeanor,
while only 6% result in an infraction. This data is striking when considering that the most
common ordinances are geographic restrictions, which operate to criminalize peaceful
begging. This effectively means that cities are not only criminalizing constitutionally protected
behavior, but they are severely punishing the exercise of the First Amendment right to ask for
help.
The data also reveals that begging laws have become increasingly popular throughout
Washington over the last 40 to 50 years. This rise in popularity corresponds with an increase in
homelessness in many cities.191 The increase also coincides with the general trend of
criminalizing visible poverty through other means.192 The chart below depicts a timeline of new
anti-begging laws being passed for five-year periods starting around 1960:
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Begging restrictions were fairly minimal throughout the State until 1976–1980, at which
time there was a sharp increase in the passage of new laws.193 This increase in anti-begging
laws occurred at the same time as the nation suffered a decline in affordable housing and a
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See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37. See infra Appendix, Part II, for a side by side comparison of the rise in
begging restrictions based on data collected for this research and the general trend of criminalization policies that
was reported in Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37.
192
Id.
193
See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
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reduction in spending for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).194 This
increase also coincides with the deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment that made it
difficult for individuals with severe mental illness to find care and shelter.195 These trends
suggest that as poverty becomes more visible in public space—due to factors including
divestments in affordable housing and mental health treatment—society responds to visible
poverty by criminalizing poverty rather than restoring investments in non-punitive options.196
Since 1996, Washington cities have been enacting anti-begging ordinances in greater
numbers. By the 2006–2010 period, Washington cities passed more than triple the number of
begging restrictions than they had during the 1991–1995 period, often enacting new
ordinances in addition to preexisting ones. Specifically, in 1991–1995 period, Washington cities
passed nine new ordinances, while in the 2006–2010 period, Washington cities passed twentynine new ordinances.
The drastic escalation during the 2006–2010 period coincides with the 2008 financial
crisis. Approximately two-thirds of all begging ordinances were enacted after 2001.197

New Begging Laws Passed
1960-2000, 34%

2001-Current, 66%
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A WRAP Primer on Transforming Rental Assistance, WESTERN REG’L ADVOCACY PROJECT,
http://wraphome.org/wraparchives/downloads/A%20WRAP%20Primer%20on%20TRA.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,
2017).
195
DANIEL YOHANNA, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, AM.
MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS (Oct. 2013), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/10/mhst1-1310.html; The
deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment was a policy decision and movement to remove individuals with
severe mental illness out of large state institutions and then those institutions were subsequently closed. This
deinstitutionalization was made without ensuring that the individuals received the care and rehabilitation
necessary in order to live successfully within the community. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING
AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS Ch. 1-3 (1997).
196
See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37; Rankin 2016, supra note 8.
197
Ordinance Chart, supra note 180. 66% of all ordinances were enacted in Washington since 2001. Id.
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A likely reason for the increase in begging restrictions is the recent upsurge of
aggressive begging laws.198 During the 1990s, courts began to strike down outright
prohibitions on peaceful begging as unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.199
In response, many cities tried to circumvent such constitutional restrictions by
incorporating non-aggressive conduct into their aggressive begging laws: for example,
begging with a partner, even if sitting down and saying nothing but only holding a sign, could
constitute aggressive begging.200 The graph below depicts the rise in aggressive begging laws
in Washington State:
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This graph shows a major increase in aggressive begging laws beginning in 2005, when
four new laws were enacted in 2005 alone, leading to 2014, when six new laws were enacted.201
In fact, 52% of all existing aggressive begging laws surveyed were enacted after 2005.202 This
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Sena, supra note 89, at 293.
See, e.g., Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993); Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679
N.E.2d 184, 190 (1997).
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Wunsch, supra note 115.
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Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
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Id.
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trend suggests that cities are attempting to circumvent judicial scrutiny by enacting aggressive
begging laws under the veil of targeting aggressive behavior rather than protected speech.
The graph below shows that the potential to criminalize even peaceful requests for
donations is rampant throughout Washington: the vast majority of aggressive begging laws
include a subjective, perception-based component as part or all of the basis for determining
when begging is unlawful. Over half of all such ordinances contain both a conduct component
and a perception component, providing even more ways to find guilt under the law. Notably,
only 2% of all aggressive begging ordinances are defined only by the specific, objective
conduct of the person asking for a donation.

Aggressive Begging: Conduct or Perception?
Neither: 2%

Conduct Only 2%

Perception Only:
42%

Conduct &
Perception: 54%

As explained in Part I, Section B, the rise of aggressive begging restrictions raises
substantial constitutional and policy concerns. Homeless criminalization ordinances are
ineffective. They do not reduce homelessness or curtail offenders from engaging in necessary,
life-sustaining behavior;203 they cost more than many non-punitive alternatives;204 they
indirectly discriminate against distinct marginalized groups;205 and they harken back to past
eras when the law was used to banish undesirable groups from public space.206 But the data
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See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2 at 36.
See Howard & Tran, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
205
See Kaya Lurie & Breanne Schuster, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, DISCRIMINATION AT
THE MARGINS: THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF HOMELESSNESS AND OTHER MARGINALIZED GROUPS 2–5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015)
(revealing how “racial minorities are disproportionately represented in the homeless population”).
206
See Ortiz & Dick, supra note 151 and accompanying text.
204

28

reveals that Washington municipalities have continued to implement punitive measures to
remove evidence of visible poverty from their cities.
B. Enforcement of Begging Restrictions in Washington
Obtaining data on the enforcement of begging restrictions in Washington’s cities
proved difficult. Although HRAP requested public records from eleven Washington cities, 207
only two cities—Marysville and Lakewood—had formally cited individuals for violating specific
begging laws in the past five years.208 Nine of the eleven cities stated that no individuals were
cited under any of the ordinances between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2018.209
2013-2017 Citations for Violating Begging Restrictions: Cities with Zero Citations210
City

Ordinance(s)

Citations

Arlington

9.56.50 Coercive Solicitation

0

Bonney Lake

9.11.050 Aggressive Solicitation

0

Centralia

10.37.030 Coercive Solicitation

0

Des Moines

19.08.030(7) Regulations & Prohibited Activities: Public Parks

0

Lake Stevens

9.08.030 Aggressive Begging

0

Issaquah

0

Mount Vernon

9.45.030 Coercive Solicitation
9.45.040 Time of Solicitation
9.21.060 Aggressive Begging

Tacoma

8.13A.040 Solicitation by Coercion

0

Puyallup

9A.08.040 Solicitation by Coercion

0

0

At first glance, the lack of reported citations might seem like a reason for free speech
advocates to celebrate. However, any enforcement data (or lack thereof) must be understood
207

Those cities are: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lakewood, Lake Stevens, Issaquah,
Marysville, Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup. Requests for records were submitted pursuant to Washington’s
Public Records Act, RCW §42.56 et seq., on January 29, 2018 and January 30, 2018.
208
The process of requesting public records from the city of Lakewood was especially challenging. Specifically, the
city of Lakewood maintains paper files of its criminal records. Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of
Lakewood, to author (Feb. 21, 2018 14:40 PST) (on file with author). Because Lakewood’s records are paper files,
the city stated that it would take over a year to search for the responsive records requested on the enforcement of
Lakewood’s anti-begging ordinances. Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of Lakewood, to author (Feb. 2,
2018 13:17 PST) (on file with author). HRAP reduced the scope of the request for data on two separate occasions
before receiving a timely response. The difficulty in obtaining data regarding the enforcement of a city’s
ordinances illustrates the importance of effective and efficient administrative procedures and policies.
209
Those cities include: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Mount Vernon,
Tacoma, and Puyallup.
210
Public records request data on file with author.
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in the context of informal enforcement methods, such as “move-along” orders and referrals to
“Designated Mental Health Professionals” for involuntary commitment.211 As explained below,
such orders are increasingly popular means of displacing visibly poor people from public view:
they achieve the same prized outcome of displacement without leaving evidence of
enforcement.
1. The Problem of Move-Along Orders
Police officers routinely order people experiencing
homelessness to move from public space as a method of
Move along orders
enforcing laws that criminalize homelessness.212 Moveeffectively extinguish
along orders are given when officers approach individuals
and chill the
or substance, “You have to move,” and
dissemination of speech telling them, in sum 213
“You can’t be here.” When individuals refuse to comply
just as formal arrests and with a move-along order, police officers threaten to issue
citations do.
an arrest.214 Such an arrest might be combined with a civil
penalty, removal to a psychiatric hospital, or the
destruction of the individual’s property.215 These move-along orders are just one of many
pervasive penalties associated with the overarching criminalization of homelessness in
Washington.216 They effectively extinguish and chill the dissemination of speech just as formal
arrests and citations do. However, individuals cannot challenge the orders without risking
arrest or issuance of civil citations. Due to the very nature of these move-along orders, they are
vulnerable to discriminatory use by police enforcement because the issuance of move-along
orders is not tracked by law enforcement within Washington.217
Move-along orders are prevalent across the country. For example, in New York, officials
have long been proponents of the “broken windows” theory, wherein the appearance of
disorder (or, in the minds of some city officials, the appearance of poverty) invites criminal
211

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.
Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, “Forced into Breaking the Law”: The Criminalization of
Homelessness in Connecticut, YALE L. SCH. (Nov. 2016),
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/news/criminalization_of_homelessness_report_for_web_full_re
port.pdf.
213
Complaint at 1, Picture the Homeless, Inc. v. New York City Police Department, No. M-I-J-16-1034067 (filed with
City of New York Comm’n Human Rights May 31, 2016) [hereinafter Picture the Homeless Complaint],
http://picturethehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Revised-Verified-Complaint-to-NYC-Commn-onHuman-Rights-filed-2016-05-31-00049320.pdf.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Christopher Herring, Dilara Yarbrough & Lisa Marie Alatorre, Pervasive Penalty: How the Criminalization of
Homelessness Perpetuates Poverty (forthcoming 2018).
217
See email from Mark Solomon, Community Crime Prevention Specialist, Seattle Police Dep’t, to author (Apr.
20, 2018, 11:00 PST) (on file with author) (“It would be hard to get an accurate number of ‘move along’ [orders]
because we don’t formally track these types of contacts.”).
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behavior.218 But over a period of approximately twelve years, individuals were arrested only six
times under New York’s anti-begging law.219 In Loper v. New York, it was conceded that while
very few arrests were made under the anti-begging law, “officers used the statute as an
authority to order individuals whom were begging to ‘move on.’”220 The Second Circuit held
that panhandling was protected speech entitled to the highest First Amendment protection.221
Yet even today, the city of New York still uses the practice of move-along orders to force
individuals experiencing homelessness to disappear from sight.222
Although move along orders are invisible because they are not recorded or reported in
many jurisdictions, existing data suggests they are a prevalent means of moving people
experiencing homelessness. In 2014, a survey of 351 individuals experiencing homelessness in
San Francisco found that 70% of individuals had been forced to move from public space by law
enforcement.223 Of those who wore ordered to move, only 9% moved to location indoors while
the remaining 91% reported that they remained in public spaces and simply moved to a new
outdoor location.224 Most individuals forced to move simply went “down the street, around the
corner, or to walk around and returned after the police left.”225 Further illustrating the
prevalence of move-along orders, over 5000 individuals received move-along orders from
police in Denver, Colorado in 2016.226
Move-along orders are also a common practice throughout cities in Washington State.
Due to the informal nature of move-along orders, this type of enforcement is not tracked by
Washington law enforcement or by cities.227 Still, as explained below, this virtually invisible
practice is common, pervasive, and potent.
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Move along orders are potent because the recipient has no recourse, no reasonable due
process of law to protect their rights. The recipient has no opportunity to challenge the
lawfulness of the underlying ordinance supporting the move-along instruction, nor is there any
real choice for the individual to make when ordered to move by law enforcement. Individuals
experiencing homelessness are simply told to leave the public space at once or face the full
weight of the law. For example, in Seattle, police officers aim for “voluntary compliance” of the
city’s sit-lie ordinance and will issue informal move-along orders as the primary means of
enforcement.228 If an individual is sleeping in a doorway or lying on the street, officers will tell
them they need to get up and go.229 This practice is common throughout all of Washington.230
Further, the city of Centralia purposefully used
“Although being asked to
only warnings to enforce an ordinance that restricted
move-along may not seem
begging at most intersections within the town.232 That
to criminalize behavior, it is
specific ordinance has since been amended.233 But the
part and parcel of a system
current version of the ordinance explicitly states that
that threatens eventual
the penalty for a first violation of coercive solicitation is
arrest for prohibited
a verbal notification and warning.234 Centralia’s city
conduct.”231
attorney, Shannon Murphy-Olson, stated that the
verbal warning change would “be beneficial because it
will not immediately impose monetary fines on people who do not have a source of income.”235
While “a ‘move along’ order may sound benign, it is enormously disruptive and harmful for
people who live on the street and do not have homes where they can seek respite from police
attention.”236 Move-along orders circumvent the voluminous repercussions associated with
criminal and civil penalties, yet they are no less offensive to civil liberty where an individual is
politely but unequivocally banished from the public eye.
Individuals experiencing homeless who spend time in public spaces, such as those
individuals who engage in begging or who rest along public sidewalks are easy targets for
move-along orders.237 Because of the insidious, disruptive, and harassing nature of these
228
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orders, they are a "pervasive penalty" associated with the overarching criminalization of
homelessness in Washington State and throughout the country.238 Pervasive penalties are a
“punitive process of policing through move-along orders, citations, and threats of arrest that
largely remain hidden from public view and official scrutiny because such enforcement falls
short of official booking.”239 As noted above, move-along orders do not trigger the regular
recordkeeping process of enforcement required under the law.240 “Official citation and arrest
numbers gloss over the thousands of instances in which officers detain, interrogate, search,
and make demands of inhabitants without activating the formal criminal justice process.”241
The public should be especially wary of those police enforcement actions, which evade
oversight.
The personal experiences of individuals on
the receiving end of move-along orders reveal the
harmful nature of informal enforcement
mechanisms. Individuals have described them as “a
constant pestering that keeps you from ever
feeling relaxed or belonging just about
anywhere.”243 Move-along orders also implicitly
encourage individuals to avoid the police, even
when facing danger.244 For example, one individual
avoided calling the police to report being assaulted, asking, “What’s the point? If I called them,
they would have made us all move.”245 These move-along orders have been identified as
having lasting collateral consequences. Specifically, they push people to unsafe spaces, lead to
adverse health effects, and effectively move individuals away from necessary resources.246

Move-along orders are
associated with the overarching
criminalization of homelessness
in Washington State and
throughout the country.242

Move-along orders find their roots in what has been officially coined the “broken
windows” theory of criminality, which has also been used to support anti-begging ordinances.
The theory uses the phrase “broken windows” as a metaphor for disorderly conduct—an image
of a street with buildings in disrepair, garbage strewn about, and general chaos and
lawlessness everywhere.247 Disorderly conduct has been defined as “incivility, boorish, and
threatening behavior that disturbs life, especially urban life.”248 The broken windows theory
238
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does not try to hide disdain for visible poverty. Rather, the theory itself clarifies that certain
individuals are the benefactors of a lawful orderly society, while certain other individuals
should be the subject of heavy policing and strict control.249
The citizen who fears . . . the importuning beggar is not merely
expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to
a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization—
namely, that serious crime flourishes in areas where disorderly behavior
goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first
broken window. . . . If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome
panhandler from annoying the passers-by, the thief may reason, it is
even less likely to call the police to identify a potentially mugger or to
interfere if a mugging takes place.250
The broken windows theory asserts that the “more people there are who are harming
no identifiable person but merely engaging in what the authors declare to be ‘disorderly
behavior,’ the more just is the engagement in an unjust act, for ‘disorderly behavior’ in and of
itself poses a ‘grave threat . . . to our society.’”251 The theory expressly encourages police to
“push the homeless along” and out of public spaces.252 Essentially, the theory is a “policy of
‘zero tolerance’ for behaviors and actions deemed disorderly or ‘worrisome’”—behaviors
which, to a proponent of the theory, undeniably include conduct associated with
homelessness.253
Move-along orders are the primary method officers use to enforce anti-begging
ordinances.254 However, in the context of begging, an individual’s First Amendment rights are
infringed upon when a police officer tells them to move-along. In Colten v. Kentucky, the
Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that found an individual
guilty of disorderly conduct when a police officer asked the defendant to leave the scene,
rejecting the defendant’s counter claim that his First Amendment rights were infringed
upon.255 Specifically, the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the defendant “‘was not
undertaking to exercise any constitutionally protected freedom.’ Rather, he ‘appears to have
had no purpose other than to cause inconvenience and annoyance. So the statute as applied
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here did not chill or stifle the exercise of any constitutional right.’”256 Scholars have interpreted
Colten to mean that “a person who congregates with others with no bona fide intention to
exercise a constitutional right . . . can be asked to move along.”257
But courts have routinely rejected enforcement policies that threaten to chill or
otherwise infringe upon the exercise of constitutionally protected speech:
When a police officer tells an individual to “move along,” the request
comes with an implicit threat that if the person does not leave the area,
he or she will be given a citation or arrested. Although citations are used
only for infractions for which punishment does not include the possibility
of jail time, a person’s failure to pay or plead to a citation can result in a
warrant for arrest. Thus, although being asked to move along may not
seem to criminalize behavior, it is part and parcel of a system that
threatens eventual arrest for prohibited conduct.258

The Problem with Move-Along Orders:
Extinguish and chill free speech;
No opportunity to challenge the orders;
Vulnerable to discriminatory use;
Not tracked by law enforcement.

Ultimately, the data—or lack of data—from Washington cities regarding enforcement of
anti-begging ordinances leads to only one of two possible conclusions: either these ordinances
are being enforced through informal means or they are wholly unnecessary. Because
Washington’s cities have no mechanism for keeping track of move-along orders, there is no
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way to understand the full extent to which these orders are given and how residents’ lives are
being affected.
But the generalized research on warnings and move-along orders establish that when
they used to prevent someone from peacefully begging, they are unconstitutional and have a
chilling effect on protected speech. Much like the futility of issuing civil penalties to those least
able to pay them, issuing move-along orders to people experiencing homelessness merely
compounds the suffering of our vulnerable neighbors.
2. Enforcement Data Retrieved from Lakewood and Marysville
Like all cities, move-along warnings likely buoy most enforcement efforts. But
Marysville and Lakewood also formally cited individuals for violating specific begging laws in
the past five years. The table below illustrates the number of citations given from January 1,
2013 to January 1, 2018. This citation data fails to capture the full extent of enforcement of
anti-begging laws in Lakewood and Marysville since move-along warnings, due to their very
nature, are pervasive penalties that escape the paper trail of official booking.
2013-2017 Citations in Lakewood & Marysville
City

Ordinances

Total Citations

Lakewood

8.76.510: Solicitation
9A.05.050: Unlawful Solicitation
9A.04.020A: Restricted Areas
9A.04.010: Aggressive Begging
6.37.040: Coercive Solicitation
6.37.030: Aggressive Begging
6.37.047: Place of Solicitation

51 citations
issued

Marysville

4 citations issued

Over a five-year period, Marysville issued only four citations. Lakewood issued fifty-one
citations. Marysville's citations include two citations for Aggressive Begging, one citation for
Coercive Solicitation, and one citation for Place of Solicitation. Curiously, in April 2018, the
Marysville City Council amended the city's municipal code to eliminate “conflicting
provisions.”259 Prior to April 2018, section 6.37.030 of Marysville’s Municipal Code was titled
Pedestrian Interference, prohibiting intentionally obstructing pedestrian traffic or aggressively
begging.260 Marysville amended that ordinance in 2018 under the new title Aggressive Begging.
The amended ordinance prohibits aggressively begging only.261 The City Council removed the
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obstructing pedestrian traffic provision because that conduct was already “covered by other
provisions in the code.”262
Still, Marysville’s Aggressive Begging ordinance now appears to directly overlap with its
Coercive Solicitation Ordinance. The overlapping ordinances prohibit effectively the same
behavior.
Marysville Overlapping Ordinances
§ 6.37.030 Aggressive Begging263
§ 6.37.040 Coercive Solicitation264
“It is unlawful to aggressively beg.”
“It is unlawful for a person to make coercive
solicitation.”
““Aggressively beg’ means to beg with the
“‘Solicitation…is any means of asking,
intent to intimidate or coerce another
begging…directed to another person,
265
person…”
requesting an immediate donation of
money…”267
“‘Beg’ means to ask for money or goods as
a charity.”266
Marysville’s two ordinances contain very similar language. Marysville’s municipal code
defines “coerce” and “coercive” as (1) approaching, speaking, or gesturing to a person in a way
that would cause a reasonable person to believe they were being threatened with a crime; (2)
approaching within one foot of a person for the purpose of making a solicitation without first
obtaining the person’s consent; (3) persisting in soliciting after being given a negative
response; (4) blocking the passage of a person; (5) engaging in conduct that “would reasonably
be construed as intended to compel or force a person being solicited to accede to demands"; or
making false or misleading representations while soliciting.268 Both Marysville’s aggressive
begging ordinance and coercive solicitation ordinance include the word “coerce” or “coercive”
in their language, effectively prohibiting the exact same behavior but with two overlapping
ordinances.
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Marysville’s overlapping ordinances
Overlapping ordinances can
present due process issues. Marysville cited one
present due process violations by individual in 2016 for coercive solicitation and
two individuals in 2017 for aggressive begging.269
opening the door to
When these two ordinances prohibit the same
discriminatory enforcement.
behavior, how does an enforcing officer know
which ordinance to cite one under? What was
the determinative factor that the officer used in deciding which ordinance to apply? According
to Marysville's data, of those three charges, only one individual was found guilty of aggressive
begging. The coercive solicitation citation was dismissed, and the other aggressive begging
citation was “amended.” The individual found guilty of aggressive begging was convicted of a
misdemeanor, which will carry severe collateral consequences for him.270
Lakewood was the only other city that reported citations. Lakewood issued fifty-one
citations for the five-year period from January 1, 2013, to January 1, 2017. This rate reflects a
higher degree of enforcement when compared to the other cities surveyed. Of those citations
issued, eleven citations were for Aggressive Begging under section 9A.04.010 of Lakewood’s
Municipal Code, and forty were for begging in a Restricted Area under section 9A.04.020A.
Zero citations were issued for sections 8.76.510 Solicitation and 9A.05.050 Unlawful
Solicitation. Lakewood issued no citations in 2017.
Lakewood's lack of formal enforcement after 2016 suggests the impact of the
Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Lakewood v. Willis, which held provisions of
Lakewood’s Restricted Areas ordinance unconstitutional.271 Still, the decline in formal citations
does not mean Lakewood is no longer enforcing these begging restrictions. As previously
explained, police commonly use the invisible enforcement mechanism of move-along orders to
achieve the same outcome.
The graph below depicts the total number of anti-begging citations Lakewood issued
between 2013 and 2017 and the number of citations issued for each ordinance. The data shows
a spike in the number of citations issued in 2014. Lakewood issued twenty-five citations in 2014
alone, accounting for nearly half of all citations issued throughout the four-year period.
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This data may suggest that, as poverty became more visible in 2014, the city responded
with greater enforcement of its begging restrictions. Pierce County, where Lakewood is
located, had the highest number of unhoused individuals in 2014, totaling 1474 individuals.272
In 2013, the county had 1303 unhoused individuals,273 and in 2015, 1283 individuals were
considered unhoused.274 So 2014 represented a spike in Pierce County's homeless population
and in Lakewood's enforcement of its begging restrictions.
Prior to 2017, Lakewood's enforcement focused primarily on begging in "restricted
areas." As illustrated below, citations for begging in restricted areas account for 78% of the
issued citations throughout the four-year period, while aggressive begging citations account
for 22% of the issued citations:
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NUMBER OF CITATIONS PER ORDINANCE
Aggresive Begging:
11 Citations

Restricted Areas:
40 Citations

Notably, it was such a "restricted area" anti-begging ordinance that the Washington
State Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in 2016. Lakewood's data does not indicate
which provisions of the ordinance applied to citations under during its four-year time period;
yet it is quite possible that some people cited under this ordinance were engaged in the very
same conduct that the Court held to be constitutionally protected in Willis.
Another key finding from Lakewood's data is that most anti-begging citations were
dismissed. Specifically, eighteen of the citations were dismissed without prejudice and sixteen
were dismissed with prejudice. When a case is dismissed with prejudice, the city is barred from
raising the issue again in another lawsuit.275 When a case is dismissed without prejudice, the
city can bring another lawsuit against the individual based on the same incident.276 While the
dismissal of these citations ultimately means those individuals will not incur criminal record for
the alleged violation, the experience of being cited or arrested for engaging in constitutionally
protected behavior is still traumatic and carries serious collateral consequences.
Fifteen of Lakewood's fifty-one citations resulted in a finding of guilt. Two of the
citations were categorized as “Guilty Other Deferral Revoked,” which Lakewood explained
“refers to revoked status or violation of a previous deferral or stipulated order of
continuance.”277 For the two citations labeled “guilty other deferral revoked,” the individual
was found guilty after violating a previous agreement to defer any sentencing or decision on
275
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the merits of the case.278 It is unclear whether those previous agreements also involved the
curtailment of any First Amendment rights. The graph below displays the variations in ultimate
disposition of each citation:

Ultimate Charge
Guilty Other Deferral Revoked: 4%
Dismissed Without Prejudice:
35%

Guilty: 30%

Dismissed With Prejudice: 31%

While guilty sentences were relatively few, the penalties for those few defendants were
disturbingly severe. Both Lakewood’s aggressive begging ordinance and its restricted area
ordinance results in a misdemeanor if violated.279 The penalties ranged from ninety-day jail
sentences, with portions of those sentences suspended, and fines ranging from $0 to
$500. The table below depicts the penalties for the five individuals found guilty aggressive
begging in Lakewood:
Aggressive Begging-Penalties
Year
Sex
Defendant 1 2013 Male
Defendant 2 2014 Female
Defendant 4 2014 Female
Defendant 3 2014 Male
Defendant 5 2016 Female

Race
White
White
White
Black
Black

Jail Sentence
90 days suspended
90 days suspended
90 days, 89 suspended
90 days, 88 suspended
90 days, 87 suspended

Fine
$0
$0
$300
$500
$0

In contrast, the following table describes the penalties for the ten citations issued to
individuals found guilty of begging in restricted areas in Lakewood:
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Begging in Restricted Areas- Penalties
Year
Sex
Race
Defendant 1
2013 Male
White
Defendant 2
2014 Male
White
Defendant 3
2014 Male
White
Defendant 4
2014 Male
White
Defendant 5
2014 Female White
Defendant 6
2014 Female White
Defendant 7
2014 Male
White
Defendant 8
2014 Female White
Defendant 9
2014 Male
White
Defendant 10 2015 Male
White

Jail Sentence
90 days suspended
90 days, 85 suspended
90 days, 88 suspended
90 days, 80 suspended
90 days, 80 suspended
90 days, 80 suspended
90 days suspended
90 days suspended
90 days suspended
90 days, 87 suspended

Fine
$0
$500
$500
$500
$0
$500
$500
$0
$0
$300

Interestingly, in Lakewood, begging in restricted areas appears to be penalized more
severely than aggressive begging. The average jail time served for aggressive begging was 1.2
days, with a range from one to three days served and the rest of the sentence suspended. In
contrast, the average time served for violations of begging in restricted areas was four days,
with a range from two to ten days served. An individual found guilty of aggressive begging was
40% likely to receive a fine ranging from $300-$500; however, an individual found guilty of
begging in a restricted area was 60% likely to receive a fine ranging from $300-$500. Notably,
an individual found guilty of begging in a restricted area had a 50% chance of receiving a $500
fine.
Demographically, men are 75% more likely to
be
cited
for violating anti-begging ordinances than
Men are 75% more likely to be
women in Lakewood. Specifically, thirty-eight of the
cited for violating anti-begging
citations were issued to males, while thirteen were
ordinances in Lakewood than issued to females. Interestingly, in 2017, 39% of
women.
unhoused individuals counted in Pierce County
identified as female and 57% identified as male.280 If
Pierce County’s demographics represent the unhoused population in Lakewood,281 this data
suggests that men are disproportionately cited for violating anti-begging restrictions.
Specifically, males account for 18% more of the unhoused population than do females, but
men are 75% more likely to be cited for violating Lakewood’s anti-begging ordinances.
In fact, the data reveals that one white male282 in particular received numerous
citations—eleven in total—accounting for 22% of all citations issued in Lakewood (ten citations
280
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for begging in restricted areas, and one for aggressive begging). He was cited twice in 2013, six
times in 2014, and three times in 2015. Out of these citations, he was found guilty of begging in
restricted areas five times (the aggressive begging citation was dismissed without prejudice),
and the other begging in restricted areas citations were dismissed. The penalties for his
citations were markedly severe: he was charged $1500 in fines (three separate $500 fines) and
was sentenced to 90 days jail for each citation, totaling a cumulative of 450 days. He served
twenty-five days in jail, receiving suspended sentences on the rest. This individual now has a
lengthy criminal record for exercising his First Amendment right to ask for help.283 Because
these are criminal charges, the impact of his record will follow him throughout his life.
Lakewood's data suggests the danger of using anti-begging ordinances to respond to
visible poverty. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in 2016, Lakewood aggressively enforced
its ordinances to deter and punish the free exercise of speech. Violators pay a heavy price for
their refusal to be silenced. Many other cities throughout Washington may have taken—or are
taking—the same stance. But Lakewood demonstrates the futility of punishing peaceful
begging and its costly impact on both the City and its residents.

PART III: BE SILENT: WASHINGTON’S RESTRICTIONS ON BEGGING
Cities demonstrate considerable
creativity in finding ways to restrict begging,
Nearly one-third of surveyed
but their efforts generally fall within these four
Washington cities have enacted
categories: (1) restrictions on who can beg
laws prohibiting begging without a through permitting requirements; (2)
permit either in public parks284 or
prohibitions on when individuals can beg
throughout the entire city.285
through time restrictions; (3) prohibitions on
where individuals can beg through distance
and place restrictions; and (4) prohibitions on how individuals can beg through aggressive
panhandling. In each category, several laws stand out as particularly concerning examples of
criminalization.
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A. Restrictions on Who Can Beg: Permitting Requirements
It has long been held that streets and parks are traditional public fora,
appropriately used for the purposes of peaceful assembly,
whereupon public discourse and the exchange of ideas may take place.286
Permitting requirements are the most common method of restricting who may solicit,
whether they do so for organized causes or for individual charity. Nearly one-third of surveyed
Washington cities have enacted laws prohibiting begging without a permit either in public
parks287 or throughout the entire city.288 Obtaining a permit can be difficult, if not impossible,
for someone experiencing homelessness as it usually involves a complex administrative
process. This process often requires the applicant to provide an address, telephone number,
other personal information, and a monetary fee that an individual experiencing homelessness
might not be able to afford.289
Functionally, permitting requirements can constitute a de facto prohibition on begging.
At the least, these restrictions have the potential to chill constitutionally protected speech by
punishing individuals for failing to plan ahead by obtaining a permit prior to exercising their
First Amendment right to ask for help. Some cities allow individuals caught while begging
without a permit to face a combination of criminal, civil, and injunctive punishments for the
same violation.290 Due to their potential to chill constitutionally protected speech, permitting
laws have been successfully challenged in court.291 Preventing individuals from engaging in
protected speech creates a prior restraint, and there is a strong presumption against the
constitutionality of any such restraint.292 As shown in the following examples, the permitting
schemes utilized throughout Washington can severely restrict an individual’s ability to exercise
free speech.
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1. Citywide Permitting Requirements: Lakewood
The city of Lakewood criminalizes begging through several ordinances, one of which
requires solicitors to register with the city’s finance department ten days prior to soliciting
within the city.293 The ordinance defines “solicitation” as a “request for contribution,
including . . . any appeal . . . made for a charitable purpose.”294 Further, the ordinance exempts
“[a]ny organizations which are…operated principally for charitable purposes, other than the
raising of funds, when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the bona fide membership
of the organization….”295 This law appears to apply to panhandling as it includes any person
“having or purporting to have a charitable nature and [who] solicits and collects contributions
for any charitable purpose.”296 Those registering must provide their contact information,
purpose of solicitation, and dates of solicitation.297 They also must pay a $10 permit fee.298 As
expected, soliciting without registering is prohibited.299
Notably, all individuals soliciting must “provide personal identification of himself or
herself upon demand by any law enforcement officer, and, upon demand, provide and exhibit a
solicitor’s permit” from the city.300 In effect, this provision allows Lakewood police officers to
interrupt and briefly seize any panhandler to demand to see their identification and permit.
However, losing and replacing identification is a common struggle for people experiencing
homelessness.301 Any violation of these permitting ordinances results in a misdemeanor.302
Lakewood’s registration requirement is subject to a constitutional challenge because it
targets a protected speech activity (charitable solicitation) for additional regulation not faced
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by other speakers.303 A law enforcement officer would not know whether they have authority
to stop a speaker and ask to see a permit without first examining the content of the speech to
determine if it is a “charitable solicitation.”304 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court found
another Lakewood ordinance content-based because it did “not prohibit solicitation generally
(it allows, for example, the solicitation of votes or customers), but only solicitation with the
particular purpose: obtaining ‘money or goods as charity.’”305 Because Lakewood’s ordinance
is content-based, it is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.306 Upon judicial review, Lakewood
would have to show that the permitting laws are the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest.307
Whether Lakewood’s ordinance would survive judicial scrutiny depends on the
compelling interest that motivated the statute. Although not required, the ordinance contains
no statement of purpose or any compelling government motive behind the registration
requirement. If the compelling interest behind Lakewood’s statute is the success of its business
or tourism industry, courts have previously rejected such an interest, and the statute would fail
to survive strict scrutiny.308 If the compelling interest behind Lakewood’s statute is public
health or public safety, the city must present meaningful evidence-based data that the law is
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.309
However, the ordinance is unlikely to
Lakewood’s ordinance is unlikely to
survive this heightened scrutiny because it
survive judicial scrutiny because it
criminalizes all charitable solicitation without
criminalizes all charitable
connection to harmful conduct. The statute is
solicitation without connection to
a broad-based, rather than a narrowly
harmful conduct.
tailored, prohibition on charitable solicitation.
The registration requirements do not give
panhandlers a chance to communicate their message without first registering with the city,
and therefore, the law is more restrictive than necessary.310 Lakewood’s law effectively
criminalizes the act of asking for help absent registration with the city.311 It is difficult to see
how prohibiting all begging without a permit is “narrowly drawn” to achieve a “compelling
state interest,” as this method of regulating begging fails to differentiate between peaceful
303
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begging representing an individual’s exercise of free speech in a classic public forum and
begging that is truly in the government’s interest to prevent.312 By any measure, Lakewood’s
registration requirement is likely unconstitutional.
Setting aside the legal infirmities, Lakewood’s ordinance poses significant practical
barriers to people experiencing homelessness. The permitting process is not suited to
applicants needing to solicit immediate donations, and the application requirements such as
providing an address, phone number, and application fee may not be feasible for homeless
individuals.313 In addition, the limited nature of many cities’ permits (e.g., valid for 90 days)314
means an individual would endure a reoccurring administrative grind just to ask for the help
they need.
2. Permitting Requirements in Public “Parks”
Many Washington cities prohibit all begging within public parks without a permit or
similar authorization from the city.315 The definition of “park,” when it is explicitly defined,
commonly includes “all public parks” but also includes other public areas of the city that are
not obviously parks, such as “playgrounds . . . sidewalks and parking lots.”316 These permitting
requirements effectively operate to restrict begging throughout large portions of public space.
Public parks are imperative to individuals experiencing homelessness because the parks
often take on aspects of the home.317 Individuals experiencing homelessness rarely, if ever,
have access to private spaces in which they can perform basic life sustaining activities such as
sleeping and bathing. Not surprisingly, people experiencing homelessness are therefore forced
312
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to do these activities in public space.318 When cities place restrictions on begging within public
parks, the possible areas of reprieve for the city’s most vulnerable population grows smaller
and smaller. Despite the popularity of begging restrictions in parks, the U.S. Supreme Court
has long held that parks are “quintessential public fora,” where the “government’s power to
regulate speech is most constrained.”319 In such a public forum, governments may enact only
limited regulations on speech.320 Park permitting requirements too often cross the line into
impermissible content-based restrictions, resulting in the suffocation of speech in public fora.
For example, Des Moines’ park use regulations, enacted in 1988 and most recently
updated in 2017, prohibits begging in all city parks.321 The ordinance reads, “No person shall
take up collections, or act as or play the vocation of solicitor [or] beggar . . . without first
obtaining a written permit from the Department.”322
Recap of Applicable Law:

City of Lakewood v. Willis, established that a law that restricts a
substantial amount of speech within traditional public forums is an
unconstitutional restriction on speech. 323

Substantial
Amount of
Speech
Traditional
Public
Forum
Infringes on
the First
Amendment
324
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The restriction is not likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Just as with general permitting
ordinances described above, park permitting requirements are a content-based restriction on
protected speech. Not only does Des Moines’ prohibit the actual act of begging, it prohibits
acting or playing the role of a “beggar.” An enforcing officer would have to listen to the
content of the message being communicated to determine whether an individual violated Des
Moines’ permitting ordinance.
However, even if Des Moines’
ordinance is a content-neutral law, it is
unlikely to even withstand intermediate
scrutiny. In Washington, cities must show a
compelling state interest for their contentneutral laws to withstand intermediate
scrutiny.325 With Des Moines’ park
permitting ordinance, the city has stated
that the law was enacted to further the
“best interest of the public health, safety,
and general welfare.”326 While public safety
is a compelling interest, there is no
connection between protected peaceful
begging and any safety risk. Unless Des Moines can produce meaningful evidence-based data
to support its assertion that the permitting ordinance is necessary for public health, safety, and
general welfare, the ordinance is likely to be deemed unconstitutional.

Des Moines’ ordinance is unlikely to
survive judicial scrutiny because the
city is unlikely to produce
meaningful evidence-based data to
support its asserted compelling
interest of public safety;
alternatively, the ordinance is likely
to be found overbroad for
prohibiting substantial speech within
a traditional public forum.

Des Moines’ ordinance prohibits substantial speech within a traditional public forum.
Regardless of whether Des Moines’ ordinance is categorized as content-based or contentneutral, the city would be unlikely to win a constitutional challenge to the ordinance because it
is likely to be found overbroad for prohibiting substantial speech within a traditional public
forum.
B. Restrictions on When Individuals Can Beg: Time Restrictions
Another common way to curb begging is to restrict when begging may be performed.327
Frequently, Washington cities designate a broad period of time when individuals may not beg.
325

The Washington Supreme Court has raised the standard for content-neutral laws based on the State
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For example, one law prohibited begging “on public property or in the residential area of the
city between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.”328 Another law covered more than half the
day, prohibiting begging within the city between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.329 Other
cities simply prohibit begging on public property “after sunset or before sunrise.”330
Issaquah’s Regulation of Solicitation ordinance, which
includes a blanket prohibition on begging after sunset, is one
example of a common time restriction.332 Specifically, the
ordinance states it is “unlawful to make solicitation to
pedestrians on public property after sunset or before
sunrise.”333 Solicitation is defined as “any means of asking,
begging, requesting, or pleading made in person, orally or in
a written or printed manner, directed to another person,
requesting an immediate donation of money . . . .”334

Blanket prohibitions on
begging after dark are
overbroad and not the
least restrictive means
of keeping the public
safe.331

Issaquah’s ordinance is a content-based restriction on speech. The law does not
prohibit all communications after sunset; rather, it prohibits sharing a very specific message—
requests for immediate donations of money. The law further applies to all areas of public
property, which unequivocally qualifies as a public forum. Accordingly, to survive judicial
scrutiny, the law must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored to achieve that end.335 Like many of the surveyed cities, Issaquah’s anti-begging
ordinance purports to serve a compelling public safety interest.336 Specifically, the ordinance
aims “to regulate and punish acts of coercive and aggressive begging, and acts of begging that
occur at locations or under circumstances . . . which create an enhanced sense of fear or
intimidation in the person being solicited, or pose risk to traffic and public safety.”337 In
essence, the city argues that every request for help made after sunset is inherently and
unavoidably aggressive or coercive, a stunning claim for which the city can likely provide no
scientific support.
Courts have long held that time-based prohibitions on begging are unconstitutional
when the city cannot cite meaningful evidence establishing that blanket prohibitions on
panhandling at night are necessary to advance public safety.338 Although Issaquah has a
328
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significant interest in promoting safety in its public areas after dark, a court would likely find
Issaquah’s content-based prohibition against begging between sunset and sunrise not
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.339 The time restriction prohibits “any means of . . .
begging. . . orally. . . or written” or “requests for items of service of value after dark.”340 The
ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it encompasses peaceful begging that does
not threaten public safety without leaving alternate means of communication.341
Courts have considered and dismissed laws that make no
distinction between harmful conduct and innocent behavior.342
Courts have also dismissed overbroad laws that prohibit
protected speech that does not threaten safety.343 Because
“[t]here is no indication that panhandling at night . . . is
inherently dangerous or threatening to the public,” a blanket
prohibition on begging after dark is overbroad and is not the
least restrictive means of keeping the public safe.344 The law
does not mention particular conduct, instead presupposing that
all requests for help after sunset inherently and incurably create
an enhanced sense of fear or intimidation. The ordinance also excludes all forms of begging,
including written requests for aid.345 Between sunset and sunrise, a person who passively holds
a sign asking for aid risks a criminal record, severe fines, and jail time.346

Issaquah’s
ordinance is
unlikely to survive
judicial scrutiny
because it
unconstitutionally
overbroad.

Laws that prohibit begging between sunset and sunrise are subject to vagueness
challenges. Because these laws regulate expression protected by the First Amendment, there
is a “heightened requirement for specificity.”347 Without designating a specific time, a “person
339
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of ordinary intelligence” might not know at what exact time begging is prohibited.348 “The hour
of ‘sun set’ on any given day, as it might appear to different persons, could hardly be expected
to be accurately observed. . . . One person might conclude the sun had set, and another might
not think so.”349 This lack of clarity raises possible violations of due process because of the
possibility of both discriminatory enforcement and lack of notice of the law.350
Finally, many individuals are heading to work before 9:00 a.m. and leaving work
between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Time restrictions that prohibit begging during
such periods of high foot traffic effectively prohibit begging when it is most likely to occur;
these busy hours are the time when people are most likely to receive help when they ask.
C. Restrictions on Where Individuals Can Beg: Place and Distance Restrictions
[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.351
Besides restricting when individuals can beg, many cities go to great lengths to control
where individuals can beg by enacting place and distance restrictions.352

Common Distance Restrictions Prohibit Begging Near:

ATMS

Public Transit
Stops

Intersections

Highway
Ramps

Crosswalks

Parking Lots

A few ordinances outright prohibit begging throughout the entire city limits.353 Cities
with such laws justify targeting the free speech of poor individuals by suggesting that even
348
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peaceful or silent requests for help pose a danger to the public simply because the request is
made near a specific location.354 Laws that restrict individuals’ access to public streets and
sidewalks for speech defy the “hallowed . . . [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine,” which protects the
right to engage in speech in a traditional public forum.355 Much like public parks, traditional
public fora include “streets, sidewalks, and roadways,” and are “subject to the strictest free
speech protections.”356 As Justice Owen Roberts wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and . . . have
been used for the purposes of . . . communicating thoughts between
citizens . . . . Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens.357
Cities can exclude a person from “a traditional public forum ‘only when the exclusion is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest.’”358 Throughout Washington, courts closely scrutinize and often strike down laws
that restrict substantial speech in traditional public fora.359 For example, in City of Lakewood v.
Willis, the Washington Supreme Court recently found two provisions of Lakewood’s “Begging
in Restrictive Areas” ordinance unconstitutional because the provisions were facially overbroad
“content-based speech restriction[s] in a substantial number of traditional public forums.”360
Specifically, Lakewood’s ordinance prohibited begging “(1) at on and off ramps leading to and
from state intersections from any City roadway or overpass; (2) at intersections of
major/principal arterials (or islands on the principal arterials) in the city….”361 The city defined
begging as “asking for money or goods as charity, whether by words, bodily gestures, signs or
other means."362 The court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the provisions by
analyzing the type of forum in which the laws operated.363 The court found that the ordinance
354
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applied to locations that were “likely to have sidewalks, which are generally held to be
traditional public for[as].”364 The court ultimately concluded that the provisions covered a
substantial number of locations in traditional public fora because the provisions applied to
every sidewalk at “on and off ramps leading to and from state intersections…” and “at
intersections of major/principal arterials…in the city[.]”365 Next, the court stated that while
cities can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, they cannot impose
content-based restrictions on speech.366 After consulting the Supreme Court’s definition of
content-based laws in Reed,367 the court concluded that Lakewood’s ordinance was contentbased because it did not prohibit solicitation generally, but only prohibited solicitation with a
particular purpose of obtaining money as charity.368 Lakewood’s provisions were found
unconstitutional.369
The concurrence in Willis also acknowledged that the
city’s
other
location-based ordinances were vulnerable to
A court would likely
overbreadth challenges.370 A law is overbroad when it
find a law prohibiting
restricts substantially more speech than necessary to achieve
begging at expansive
a legitimate public interest.371 Courts are concerned that laws
locations in traditional prohibiting too many behaviors related to speech can “chill a
public fora as
substantial amount of activity protected by the First
unconstitutionally
Amendment,”372 particularly when the law “imposes criminal
overbroad.
sanctions.”373 But this extensive, overbroad application is
precisely that which is common in cities throughout
Washington.
Given Washington precedent, a court would likely find that prohibiting begging at such
an expansive list of locations in traditional public fora (as seen in City of Lakewood v. Willis) is
unconstitutionally overbroad. For example, laws that prohibit begging near bus stops or
neutral narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.”) (internal citations omitted).
364
Id. at 1062 (the court stated that a sidewalk can be a nonpublic forum in some circumstances, but the city did
not meet its burden of showing that the sidewalks existed to solely facilitate access to a private locations).
365
Id. at 1063.
366
Id.
367
“[A] law is content based if ‘on its face [it]…define[s] regulated speech by particular subject matter…[or] by its
function or purpose.” Id.
368
Id.
369
Id. at 1064.
370
Id. at 1064 (Stephens, J., concurring) (“[e]xamining the entire ordinance under which the City charged Willis, I
conclude that LMC 9A.04.020A is facially overbroad. While the ordinance might conceivably have legitimate
applications in nonpublic areas, on its face, it substantially restricts protected speech in a wide range of public for[a]
traditionally open to First Amendment activity. And, on its face, it targets a particular category of protected speech,
making it an unconstitutional content-based restriction under…Reed[.]”) (internal citations omitted).
371
Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2013).
372
Id. at 878.
373
Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003)); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244
(finding laws that impose “criminal penalties on protected speech . . . a stark example of speech suppression”).
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business entrances might still fail judicial scrutiny because bus stops and business entrances
are themselves within the public fora. Although some city officials might bristle at such critical
review of begging ordinances, the fact remains that local laws must conform to constitutional
requirements that protect all residents, not just residents with stable housing.374
Once again, the City of Lakewood provides a specific example. In addition to the
permitting requirements previously outlined,following Lakewood v. Willis, the city of
Lakewood continues to restrict range of distance for solicitors. The city has two ordinances
with specific distances restrictions on soliciting within the city.375 The ordinances and the
specific restrictions are detailed in the table below.
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050:
Unlawful solicitations376

Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A: Restrictive
Areas377

Defines solicitation as “any oral or written
request for a contribution…any appeal is
made for any charitable purpose.”
Exempts “any organizations which are…
operated principally for charitable
purposes, other than the raising of funds,
when the solicitation of contributions is
confined to the bona fide membership of
the organization. . .”
Unlawful to solicit:
• in public streets/alleys or to solicit
anyone who is “in or upon” public
streets/alleys;
• within ten feet of any crosswalk or
any entrance or exit of a building
used by the general public; or
• from any sidewalk within ten feet of
its intersection with an alley or
driveway.

Defines begging as “asking for money or
goods or charity, whether by words, bodily
gestures, signs or other means.”
No exemptions.

Unlawful to solicit:
• within twenty-five feet of an ATM
or financial institution;
• within fifteen feet of any occupied
“handicapped” parking space, bus
stop, train station; or
• in any public parking lot, structure,
or walkway dedicated to such
parking lot or structure;
• before sunrise or after sunset at any
public transportation facility or on
any public transportation vehicle.

374

See Michael Simpson, ACLU Raises Concerns with Lakewood’s Rewrite of Panhandling Law, NEWS TRIBUNE (Feb.
23, 2017). After the Washington State Supreme Court’s ruling in Willis, Lakewood Mayor Don Anderson decried
the Court’s “activist . . . attempts to legislate policy rather than interpret the law.” Id. Such a statement reveals a
common misunderstanding by elected officials as to the constitutionally protected nature of begging as speech
and the court’s role in enforcing those protections.
375
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010) and MC § 9A.04.020A.
376
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
377
Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A.
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First, Lakewood’s restrictions close off many downtown areas and access points that,
besides being traditional public fora, are the most logical places to beg. Specifically, the
ordinances impose restrictions on begging in public streets and alley or attempting to beg
anyone in public streets or alleys;378 they prohibit begging from any sidewalk within ten feet of
a public driveway or alley;379 and they prohibit begging within fifteen feet of any bus stop or
train station.380
These restrictions are hardly intuitive; a person experiencing homelessness would have
no reasonable way of knowing where they may ask for help or where they risk incurring a fine
or incarceration. For example, the image below shows a satellite photo of a downtown area in
Lakewood. Based on the ordinance, the image shows red boxes indicating peripheries within
ten or fifteen feet of which an individual cannot beg. The blue lines enclose public streets that
are also prohibited areas for begging. As illustrated below, when considering that Lakewood
MC § 9A.04.020A also prohibits begging in any parking lot,381 much of the geographic area
within Lakewood becomes a “restricted area” where individuals cannot ask for help without
risking criminal liability.

Second, Lakewood’s ordinances impose content-based restrictions on speech.
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050, while at first glance may appear to be content-neutral because it
appears to impose restrictions on solicitation in general, the separate provisions of the
ordinance work together to create a content-based restriction. Specifically, Lakewood MC
378

Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
Id.
380
Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020 (2011).
381
Id.
379
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§ 9A.05.050 defines solicitation as a request for a charitable purpose.382 In analyzing whether
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 imposes a content-based restriction on speech, one need only look
as far as Lakewood v. Willis, where the court found that Lakewood's previous law was contentbased because it did not prohibit solicitation generally, but only solicitation with a particular
purpose of obtaining money as charity.383 Similarly, Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 prohibits
solicitations requested for charitable purposes, not solicitation generally.384
Third, even if both ordinances were content-neutral, a court would likely find they fail
to leave open alternative channels of communications. For example, Lakewood’s ordinances
prohibit both oral and written requests for help. Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 defines solicitation
as “oral or written” requests for contributions,385 and Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A defines
begging as “asking for money…whether by words, bodily gestures, signs or other means.”386
The city’s ordinances fail to allow individuals alternative means of communicating their need
for help. The city could allow for passive sign-holding in some locations,387 rather than
prohibiting both oral and written requests for help; however, the ordinances literally prohibit
all possible means of communicating a message. In considering any compelling interest that
the city may assert as justification for these laws, the only threat to public safety might come
from forceful, repeated verbal solicitations. But the ordinances do not distinguish between
harmful conduct and peaceful begging—leaving the city vulnerable to overbreadth
challenges.388
Fourth, Lakewood’s ordinances place “buffer zones” around crosswalks, intersections,
ATM’s and financial institutions, parking spaces, parking lots, train stations, and bus
stations.389 Courts have found that while buffer zones around facilities like ATMs may be
appropriate if they are the least restrictive means of meeting the city’s interest, buffer zones
are not always required to protect public safety.390 Here, Lakewood’s buffer zones around
crosswalks, “handicapped” parking spaces, bus stops, and train stops are unlikely to withstand
judicial scrutiny because they are unlikely to be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
interest of public safety. For example, panhandling within buffer zones around bus stops has
been described as “more bothersome” but not as “demonstrably more dangerous.” 391 Absent
evidence to the contrary, a court would likely find that Lakewood’s buffer zones are not the
least restrictive means necessary to achieve a compelling interest.392

382

Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016).
384
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
385
Id.
386
Id.
387
Id.
388
Willis, 375 P.3d at 1064 (Stephens, J., concurring).
389
Lakewood MC §§ 9A.05.050 (2010) & 9A.04.020 (2011).
390
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d. 177, 196 (D. Mass. 2015).
391
Id. at 195.
392
Id.
383
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Overall, place and distance restrictions raise serious constitutional concerns because
they limit otherwise protected speech in traditional public fora—a cherished space for free
speech protections. These place and distance restrictions do not try to hide the fact that they
are entirely content-based restrictions, which stifle the
Place and distance
exercise of one form of speech but not others. Although a
restrictions raise serious
resident may stand near a crosswalk or bus stop
constitutional concerns
advertising local businesses or asking motorists to vote for
because they limit
an upcoming candidate, that same resident may face
otherwise protected
criminal penalties when the content of her speech shifts
from business advertising or political lobbying to a request
speech in a traditional
for help. Washington’s Supreme Court has already
public fora.
signaled its willingness to strike down such hopelessly
unconstitutional ordinances.
D. Restrictions on How Individuals Can Beg: Manner Restrictions
The last category of anti-begging laws includes sweeping restrictions on how begging
can be performed. These ordinances are often labeled to suggest they target “aggressive” or
“coercive” begging. However, such categorization is misleading because these laws are often
“designed to be enforced against people who are engaging in harmless activities when
requesting a donation.”393
Aggressive begging ordinances are typically not triggered by the intentionally
aggressive or coercive behavior of the panhandler; rather, culpability is most often triggered by
the “reasonable fear” of the listener.394 But as discussed above, studies show that society
frequently responds to evidence of visible poverty and human desperation with fear.395 This
fear is so common that even peaceful non-coercive begging can be interpreted as frightening
or disturbing to people who witness it. Compelling sociological studies show that mere
exposure to visible poverty triggers highly negative reactions from those who witness it.396
Thus, begging restrictions that turn on a witness’s perception—as opposed to some objective
measure of conduct—are overbroad. People asking for help could be punished not because of
anything they did but because of how their conduct was perceived.
1. The Problem with Perception-Based Definitions of Aggressive Begging
A core principle of criminal law is that culpability attaches based on conduct. It is our
knowing and intentional decision to engage in wrongful conduct—the mens rea—that makes a
bad act unlawful. Yet laws deriving culpability on the subjective perception of the victim turns
this core concept of criminal law on its head, attaching criminal liability without the accused
393

See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 20.
See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
395
See Rankin 2015, supra note 55.
396
Id.
394
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having any intention of wrongdoing. More important, speakers have no way of knowing what
conduct is acceptable under the law. Individuals will inevitably be forced to censor or silence
their speech out of fear it could be interpreted as a threat by the “reasonable” person who
happens to hear, see, or read their message.
By far the most common, 96% of all aggressive
begging laws in Washington include a subjective
perception-based component.398 For example, many
ordinances begin by defining “aggressive begging” as
asking for help “with the intent to intimidate another
person into giving money or goods.”399 But intimidation is
most often defined as “engag[ing] in conduct which would
make a reasonable person feel fearful or compelled.”400 Even attempting to ground the law in
the accused’s “intent to intimidate,” the laws define intimidation wholly on the subjective
standards of the listener. Such an approach to criminalization presents several constitutional
concerns and erodes the breathing space that safeguards the free exchange of ideas.401

96% of all aggressive
begging laws in
Washington include a
subjective perceptionbased component.397

Perception-based laws make it challenging to know whether a reasonable person feels
fearful or compelled because of the speaker’ specific conduct or because a visibly poor person
subconsciously elicits feelings of discomfort or even repulsion.402 Both the appearance of a
visibly poor person and the circumstances of asking for help make one feel compelled, whether
by fear or sympathy, to make a donation. When the mere sight of visible poverty triggers
397

Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
Id.
399
Anacortes MC § 9.24.050 (1999); Arlington MC § 9.56.020(1) (2014) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce. . .”)
(emphasis added); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bellevue MC § 10.06.010(B)(1) (2005); Bonney Lake MC §
9.11.060(A) (2016) (“‘Aggressive solicitation’ means behavior that is intended to harass or intimidate . . .”);
Bremerton MC § 9A.44.110(b) (2014); Des Moines MC § 9.68.030(2), (1)(a) & (c) (1988); Everett MC § 9.52.010(A)(2)
(1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(a),(2) (1994); Lake Stevens MC § 9.08.030(b)(1) (2012); Marysville MC §
6.37.020(1) (2012) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce . . .) (emphasis added); Moses Lake MC § 9.22.010 (2011);
Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.060(A) (2011); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.030(2), 020(1) (2013) (“with the intent to intimidate
or coerce. . .”) (emphasis added); Port Angeles MC § 11.18.020(A) (2005); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997).
400
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(7) (2014); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(c) (2016) (intimidate “means to coerce
or frighten into submission or obedience or to engage in conduct which would make a reasonable person fearful or
feel compelled to give the person money or goods.”); Bremerton MC § 9A.44.110(a)(1) (2014); Everett MC §
9.52.020(D) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(e) (1994) (Intimidate “means to engage in words or conduct
which would make a reasonable person feel compelled to give money to a person”); Port Angeles MC 11.18.020(B)
(2005); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997) (intimidate “means to use words or engage in conduct that would likely cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily harm, fear damage to or loss of property, or otherwise be compelled into giving
money or other things of value”); Sammamish MC § 22.05.110(b) (2000); Seattle MC § 12A.12.015(A)(2) (1987);
University Place MC § 9.55.010 (2)(A)(2) (2004); Vancouver MC § 7.04.030(3) (2003).
401
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
402
See Rankin 2015, supra note 55, at 390 (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the
Low: Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006)); Steven J. Ballew,
Panhandling and the First Amendment: How Spider-Man Is Reducing the Quality of Life in New York City, 81 BROOK.
L. REV. 1167, 1168, 1171–72 (2016).
398
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fearful reactions, how can a person experiencing homelessness hope to ask for help in
conformance with the law? How can a police officer, responding to a complaint, be expected to
reliably determine which impulse led to the donation? In these situations, even peaceful
begging can trigger a conviction for aggressive begging based on the reaction of the person
being solicited.403 The Supreme Court has “explained [that] a regulation is not vague because it
may at times be difficult to prove . . . but rather [it is vague] because it is unclear as to what fact
must be proved.”404 While these aggressive begging laws are popular Washington ordinances,
it is often unclear what facts support a conviction under an aggressive begging ordinance
above and beyond the mere appearance of a visibly poor person and the peaceful exercise of
free speech.405
The simplest solution to this problem would be to
replace perception-based ordinances with objective conductbased ordinances that specifically describe how a person
cannot ask for help. But even then, such ordinances would
impact the exercise of free speech and would need to be
narrowly tailored to conform to the strict scrutiny standard.
As illustrated below, manner-based components to
aggressive begging laws are often overly broad and
criminalize otherwise lawful conduct.

Manner-based
components to
aggressive begging laws
are often overly broad
and criminalize
otherwise lawful
conduct.

2. Not in that Way: Conduct-Based Begging Laws
Municipalities attempt to avoid judicial scrutiny of their anti-begging restrictions by
prohibiting different conduct under the guise of protecting public health and safety.406
However, these attempts fail when the prohibited conduct is attached to a regulatory scheme
that targets a particular form of expression, like immediate requests for donations.407 In one
example, a city in Illinois added a conduct-based element to an ordinance that prohibited oral
requests for money after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was a
403

See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 20 (stating that laws “purportedly aimed at curbing threatening . . .
behavior . . . are sometimes designed to be enforced against . . . harmless activities” like begging).
404
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
405
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (asserting that the Supreme Court has “struck down statutes
that tied . . . culpability to . . . wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context or
settled legal meanings”).
406
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.010(1) (2014) (stating that its solicitation and camping regulations serve to “protect
and preserve the public safety of pedestrians and to insure the safe and efficient movement of pedestrian and
vehicular traffic in public places”); Lacey MC § 5.21.010 (1998) (stating that its begging regulations serve the purpose
of promoting “the health, safety, peace, and general welfare” of its citizens and visitors).
407
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d. 177, 185 (2015) (noting that a law purporting to regulate
conduct accompanying expression will be subject to strict scrutiny when it “targets a particular form of expressive
speech—the solicitation of immediate charitable donations—and applies its regulatory scheme only to that subject
matter”); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221 (D. Mass. 2015) (interpreting a content-based
prohibition that made it “unlawful for any person to beg, panhandle or solicit in an aggressive manner”).
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form of content discrimination and was subject to strict scrutiny.408 The new addition
prohibited individuals from requesting a donation “while knowingly approaching within five
feet’" of the person solicited.409 When the modified ordinance was re-challenged, the city
argued that the ordinance “regulate[d] activity, not speech.”410 However, the Seventh Circuit
again held that the ordinance was a content-based restriction on speech because it restricted
individuals from approaching a person while asking for a donation but allowed individuals to
approach a person while engaging in other types of speech.411 Following the Court’s analysis in
Reed, the analysis of the Seventh Circuit represents a growing trend of courts invalidating
aggressive begging laws.
Many begging restrictions target such a broad array of conduct they would fail judicial
tests that require restrictions of speech to be the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental interest.412 For example, many of the surveyed cities413 prohibit (1)
approaching within a certain distance of a person without receiving that person’s consent;414
(2) persisting in begging after being given a negative response;415 (3) begging in the company
of any other person;416 (4) begging with a child;417 (5) begging from anyone under the age of
sixteen;418 (6) using false or misleading information while begging for the purpose of making a
408

Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016).
Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 15-3276, 2015 WL 8023461, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2015) (quoting Springfield MC
§ 131.06(a)(1)).
410
Id. at *2 (quoting Springfield MC § 131.06(a)(1)).
411
“Although the language of the current ordinance has been modified, it still addresses the content of the plaintiffs'
speech. The plaintiffs can ask for the time, talk about the weather, ask someone to sign a petition, or even solicit
support (either nonmonetary support or for a future contribution) for causes or organizations while approaching
within five feet of the person being addressed. However, the plaintiffs are not permitted to ask pedestrians for ‘an
immediate donation of money or other gratuity’ while ‘knowingly approaching within five feet’ of the individual.
The ordinance subjects the Plaintiffs to criminal penalties for asking for immediate donations of money in those
circumstances.” Id.
412
Supra Part I, Section B.
413
In addition to perception and conduct, most cities include the “place” and “distance” provisions, discussed in
Section III, Part C of this Brief (e.g., near bus stops, ATMs, intersections, and gas stations) in their “aggressive”
begging ordinances, which purport to serve as evidence of aggressive begging.
414
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(B) (2014); Centralia MC § 10.37.030 (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(b)
(2010); Issaquah MC §9.45.020(A)(2) (2008); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(A) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(1) (2008);
Marysville MC 6.37.020(2)(b) (2012); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(2) (2008); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.020(2)(b) (2014).
415
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(C) (2014) (persisting provision); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A)(a) (2016)
(persisting and following provisions); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(c) (2010) (persisting provision); Federal Way
RMC § 6.35.030(1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994) (persisting and following provisions); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(3) (persisting
provision); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(c) (2012) (persisting provision); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(3) (2008)
(persisting provision); Oak Harbor MC 6.95.020(2)(c) (2014) (persisting provision). Bonney Lake explains “negative
statements” as those statements that communicate that the individual does “not intend to donate.” Bonney Lake
MC § 9.11.060 (2016).
416
See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998).
417
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.070 (2014); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.050(B)
(2016); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(h) (2010); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997); SeaTac MC § 8.05.740(B)(1)(d) (1995).
418
See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(D) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(4) (2008). This type of prohibited conduct is
problematic. How is an individual supposed to accurately know the age of the person they are soliciting from?
409
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solicitation;419 (7) engaging with the driver of a parked car;420 (8) begging and blocking or
impeding pedestrian traffic;421 and (9) begging for the purpose of soliciting vehicular traffic.422
Although each point listed above might appear to
refer to conduct, they are tied to the content of the speech
Content-neutral laws
being communicated. Content-neutral laws already exist
already exist to prohibit
423
many behaviors targeted to prohibit many of the above behaviors. For a police
officer to find a violation of the above laws, the officer
in aggressive begging
must evaluate the message being communicated. Because
laws.
these laws specifically target begging and have the
potential of chilling peaceful constitutionally protected
requests for donations, they are both content-based restrictions on speech and subject to strict
scrutiny. A closer examination of each manner-based provision reveals the constitutional
infirmities. For instance, many of the surveyed cities prohibit individuals from coming within a
certain distance of another person to make a solicitation without receiving that person’s
consent.424 But what qualifies as consent? Is a smile, a nod, a gesture, or a look of
acknowledgment sufficient, or must consent be verbally expressed? Further, it is unclear
whether the solicitor must obtain the consent of the person before or after making the
request.425 Because these provisions do not provide fair notice of what is prohibited, they may
fail under a constitutional challenge for vagueness.426
419

See, e.g., Auburn MC 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Centralia MC § 10.37.020(B)(7) (2014); Covington MC
§ 9.190.020(1)(g) (2010); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(6) (2008); Lakewood MC § 05.56.140 (1998); Marysville MC
§ 6.37.020(2)(f) (2012); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(6) (2008); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.020(2)(f); SeaTac
MC § 8.05.740(B)(1) (1995).
420
See, e.g., Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.050(E)(1)(g) (2011); Lacey MC § 5.21.030(C) (1998); Tacoma 13.A.030(A)(1)(g)
(2007).
421
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(D) (2014); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC
§ 9.11.060(A)(2) (2016); Centralia MC § 10.37.020(B)(4) (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(d) (2010); Everett MC §
9.52.010(A)(1) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(c), (2)(b) (1994); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(4) (2008); Lacey
MC § 5.21.040(B) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(2) (2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(d) (2012); Monroe MC §
9.35.020(A)(4) (2008); Puyallup MC § 9A.08.020(2)(c) (2009); Sunnyside MC § 5.22.050(C) (2007); Tacoma MC §
8.13.A.020(B)(3) (2007); Wenatchee MC § 6A.13.020(1) (1989).
422
Interestingly, these types of restrictions raise the question of why it is not illegal for business owners to solicit
customers by waiving signs towards traffic.
423
For example, many cities have content-neutral ordinances that prohibit harassment, fraud, and pedestrian
interference. These content-neutral laws target the harmful behavior without infringing on constitutionally
protected speech.
424
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(B) (2014) (one foot); Centralia MC § 10.37.030, 020(b) (2014) (two feet and
provides progressive penalties); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(b) (2010) (one foot); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(2)
(2008) (one foot); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(A) (1998) (three feet); Longview MC § 9.23.040(1) (2008) (three feet);
Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(b) (2012) (one foot); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(2) (2008) (one foot); Oak Harbor MC §
6.95.020(2)(b) (2014) (one foot).
425
Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 1276, 1297 (D. Colo. 2015).
426
But cf. id. (finding that a law requiring consent before making a solicitation is not unconstitutionally vague
under Due Process requirements because consent may be expressed via an affirmative statement or implied via
action or inaction).
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As another example, many of the surveyed cities prohibit individuals from (1) following
a person to ask for money after that person has given a negative response427 and (2) continuing
to beg from a person after that person has given a negative response.428 Aside from the
vagueness of the phrase “negative response,” these “bans on following a person and
panhandling after a person has given a negative response are not the least restrictive means
available.”429 As the United States District Court of Massachusetts aptly explained:
A panhandler who asks for change from a passerby might, after a
rejection, seek to explain that the change is needed because she is
unemployed or state that she will use it to buy food. These
additional post-rejection messages do not necessarily threaten
public safety; their explanations of the nature of poverty sit at the
heart of what makes panhandling protected expressive conduct in
the first place. Likewise, a panhandler might follow someone in
order to convey a longer message. Both behaviors might be
utilized where a promising target—someone who might want to
hear a panhandler’s message—walks by a panhandler without
noticing him at all. If panhandling is truly valuable expressive
speech, then panhandlers may have a right to more than one shot
at getting their message across.430
In a third example, at least one of the surveyed cities prohibits individuals from begging
in a group of two or more people.431 Prohibiting individuals from begging together, “whose
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See, e.g., Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A)(c) (2016) (“[f]ollowing a person for purposes of solicitation at a close
distance where a reasonable person would be intimidated or in fear of their safety”); Federal Way RMC
§ 6.35.030(2)(a), (1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(E) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(5) (2008) (“following
a person who walks away from the panhandler, if the panhandler’s conduct is intended to or is reasonably likely to
intimidate the person being solicited into responding affirmatively to the solicitation”); Spokane MC § 10.10.025
(B)(1) (2015).
428
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(C) (2014); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A) (2016); Covington MC
§ 9.190.020(1)(c) (2010); Federal Way Revised Code § 6.35.030(1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(3)
(2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(c) (2012); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(3) (2008); Oak Harbor § MC 6.95.020(2)(c)
(2014); Puyallup MC § 9A.08.020(2)(b) (2009); Spokane MC § 10.10.025(B)(1) (2015); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(D)
(2007); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020(B)(2) (2007).
429
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 193 (D. Mass. 2015).
430
Id. (emphasis added).
431
See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more
persons, except where one or more panhandler(s) is/are under the age of eighteen and is/are the dependent
child(ren) of the other panhandler”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within
fifty feet of any other panhandler, except where one or more panhandler(s) is/are under the age of eighteen and
is/are the dependent child(ren) of the other panhandler”).

63

activity is otherwise permissible,” fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.432 Such prohibitions violate
both the First Amendment’s protection of speech and protection of assembly.433 Even if the
city attempts to prohibit group begging in an “intimidating manner,” the law will not survive
strict scrutiny “in the absence of . . . evidence. . . that ‘intimidating’ group panhandling is more
dangerous than ‘intimidating’ solo panhandling.”434
In many of the surveyed cities, begging prohibitions duplicate existing pedestrian
interference provisions and obstruction of traffic laws.435 These laws commonly prohibit
blocking or impeding pedestrian traffic and blocking, impeding, or distracting vehicular traffic
while begging.436 Yet many cities already address the corresponding public safety concerns
through facially neutral and constitutionally valid “obstruction of traffic” or “pedestrian
interference” laws that apply to everyone regardless of the type of speech.437
For example, Tacoma has a Solicitation by Coercion438 ordinance duplicative of its
Pedestrian Interference439 ordinance. The ordinances are described in the chart below:

432

See McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 194-95 (holding that group panhandling restrictions cannot survive strict
scrutiny “in the absence of record evidence that panhandling in a group of two or more is a greater threat to public
safety than panhandling alone”).
433
Id. at 194 (holding that a prohibition on begging “in a group of two or more ‘in an intimidating’ manner” was
vague because it did not define “intimidating,” and infringed upon the First Amendment’s protection of speech and
of assembly).
434
See id. at 195.
435
For example, compare Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.050(F) (2011), which defines as a part of aggressive begging
walking or standing “in such a manner as to block passage by another person or a vehicle,” with Mount Vernon MC
§ 9.21.045(B) (2012), which prohibits entering or being present in a prohibited roadway when the roadway is open
to traffic.
436
See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(D) (2014); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC
§ 9.11.060(A) (2016); Centralia MC § 10.37.020(B)(4) (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(d) (2010); Everett MC
§ 9.52.010(A)(1) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(2)(b) (1994); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(4) (2008); Lacey MC
§ 5.21.040(B) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(2) (2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(d) (2012); Monroe MC
§ 9.35.020(A)(4) (2008); Puyallup MC § 9A.08.020(2)(c) (2009); Sunnyside MC § 5.22.050(C) (2007); Tacoma MC
§ 8.13.A.020(B)(3) (2007); Wenatchee MC § 6A.13.020(3) (1989).
437
Of course, even facially neutral laws may be disproportionately enforced against people experiencing
homelessness such that the laws become another mechanism for criminalizing individuals with no reasonable
alternative. See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37.
438
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007).
439
Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991).
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§ 8.13A.040 Solicitation by
Coercion
Ordinance
Language

▪
▪

Penalty

▪
▪

§ 8.13.030 Vehicular or Pedestrian
Interference

“It is unlawful for a
person to solicit by
coercion.”440
Coercion means “to
block, either
individually or as part
of a group of persons,
the passage of a
solicited person.”441

▪

Gross misdemeanor.
Fine of $5,000,
incarceration up to
one year, or both fine
and imprisonment.444

▪
▪

▪

Obstruct pedestrian traffic
means to “walk, stand, sit, lie,
or place an object in such a
manner as to block passage
by another person.”442
A person is guilty of
pedestrian interference “if he
or she intentionally obstructs
pedestrian traffic.”443
Misdemeanor.
Fine not to exceed $1000,
imprisonment not to exceed
90 days, or both fine and
imprisonment.445

This table illustrates how Tacoma’s two ordinances overlap to prohibit almost the exact
same behavior—blocking pedestrian traffic. However, the difference in the Solicitation by
Coercion ordinance is that the behavior of blocking pedestrian traffic is combined with making
a solicitation.446 Tacoma defines solicitation as “ask[ing], beg[ging]. . . whether orally or in a
printed manner, for the purpose of immediately receiving contributions. . . .”447 Again, this is a
content-based restriction on speech because an enforcing officer would have to listen to the
solicitor’s message before determining if the solicitor violated the law, and because it allows
solicitations for other means, such as registering others to vote. Further, Tacoma’s Solicitation
by Coercion statute has a drastically different penalty for engaging in a constitutionally
protected form of speech, causing due process issues to likely arise due to arbitrary
enforcement.

440

Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007).
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020 (2007).
442
Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991).
443
Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991).
444
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.060 (2007). Interestingly, Tacoma’s Solicitation by Coercion has steeper penalties than the
city’s Sexual Assault Ordinance. Tacoma MC § 8.12.090 (1987) (“Any person convicted of sexual assault shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .”) (emphasis added).
445
Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991).
446
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007).
447
Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020(I) (2007). Tacoma defines solicit as “Solicit and all derivative forms of solicit means to
ask, beg, solicit, or plead, whether orally or in a written or printed manner, for the purpose of immediately receiving
contributions, alms, charity, or gifts of items of value for oneself or another person.” Id. (emphasis added). Only if
the solicitor was asking for an immediate contribution would the solicitor be in violation of the law because the
law regulates the solicitor's "function or purpose.”
441
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Overall, aggressive begging laws consistently raise constitutional and policy concerns.
The perception-based component, in almost every aggressive begging ordinance, provides no
guidance to people experiencing homelessness on how to conform their conduct in a manner
consistent with the law. Adding enumerated lists of prohibited behavior rarely helps. More
often than not, these enumerated lists raise questions of vagueness and are suspect to
overbreadth challenges because they have the potential of chilling peaceful requests
accompanying such behavior.
If public safety is the true aim of aggressive
begging laws, these laws should be triggered only if
someone begging is engaged in objectively
aggressive, threatening, or harassing behavior—
behavior that already constitutes a crime in virtually
every jurisdiction. Given the scope of protection
already afforded by existing criminal codes,
aggressive begging laws are unnecessary and
overbroad, especially because they so often apply to
otherwise peaceful begging—a form of free speech. If
particular conduct would not trigger liability under
existing assault or harassment laws, then the
conclusion is obvious: the conduct is not unlawful,
even in the context of solicitation.

If public safety is the true
aim of aggressive begging
laws, they should be
triggered only if someone
begging is engaged in
objectively aggressive
behavior—conduct that
already constitutes a crime
in virtually every
jurisdiction.
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Part IV: Recommendations and Conclusion

448

Washington State’s pervasive policy of restricting begging as a form of disfavored
speech prompts four key recommendations: (1) peaceful begging should not be criminalized;
(2) cities should repeal laws that apply to peaceful begging; (3) aggressive begging laws should
be repealed; and (4) cities should recognize peaceful begging as a legitimate plea for help.
A. Peaceful Begging Should Not Be Criminalized
First, as evidenced by the data collected, cities are criminalizing peaceful begging
through implementing geographical, distance, time, and manner restrictions on begging. As
demonstrated, these restrictions work to chill and prohibit First Amendment protected speech
and violate individuals’ due process rights. The First Amendment and Due Process Clause are
hallmarks of America’s society; any negative impact on these rights is a direct attack on the
United States Constitution.
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Illustration by Simon Kneebone, Homeless? Don’t Hold Your Breath… (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://simonkneebone.com/tag/homeless/.
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Research has shown that criminalization ordinances are ineffective at addressing the
root causes of homelessness.449 Civil and criminal penalties charged by anti-begging laws are
significant,450 hearings and jail time can lead to unemployment, probation conditions can be
impossible to comply with,451 and a criminal record can prevent individuals from being eligible
for housing subsidies and federal benefits.452 Cities can easily expend vast amounts of
resources defending the legality of these ordinances, only to have courts repeatedly affirm that
begging is a form of protected speech worthy of the highest constitutional scrutiny.453

Misdemeanors
Negatively Impact:
Housing
Eligibility

Employment
Opportunities

Government
Benefits

Immigration
Status

Parental
Rights
454

With these geographic, distance, and time restrictions, cities are punishing peaceful,
constitutionally protected behavior. The data collected shows that cities often severely punish
violations as misdemeanors. These misdemeanors carry real, collateral consequences that
severely affect an individual’s ability to gain housing, employment, and government
benefits.455 Even where begging is punished by fines, “civil sanctions do not provide for the

449

NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 36.
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 34 (stating that “costs resulting from criminalization measures ... are
present at multiple stages of the criminal justice process,” and people experiencing homelessness are often unable
to pay, resulting in increased jail time, suspension of their driver’s license, and poor credit); see also Joseph Shapiro,
As
Court
Fees
Rise,
the
Poor are
Paying the
Price,
NPR.ORG
(May
19,
2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.
451
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 37 (“[H]omeless people are more prone to violate their probation due to
practical difficulties in complying with the ordered conditions. Maintaining a stable location where they can be
monitored by probation officers, affording public transportation to and from required appointments, and remaining
out of high crime areas can all be difficult, if not impossible, conditions for homeless people to comply with.”).
452
Id. at 32–33.
453
The exact cost of defending such lawsuits is worthy of further research. Unfortunately, some cities are highly
resistant toward compliance with the Public Records Act and transparency in government overall. Poor public
access to municipal data and records is a finding that has been noted by HRAP researchers for years. Olson &
MacDonald, supra note 37.
454
Rhodan, supra note 7.
455
Id.
450
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same due process protections as criminal penalties.”456 Further, these fines contribute to the
debtor’s prison when individuals cannot pay them.
Ultimately, criminalization measures—including anti-begging ordinances—waste
taxpayer dollars because they cycle people experiencing homelessness through the costly
criminal justice system with no meaningful results.457 Providing reasonable housing options to
those in need is more effective than processing people through the criminal justice system.458
This brief uncovers a consistent theme: cities are eager to circumvent the free speech and due
process rights of homeless residents to lift pressure from business owners and residents. But
local and national jurisprudence increasingly suggests that courts will not permit cities to
restrict peaceful requests for help under the guise of public safety. Cities should work to create
solutions to homelessness that will help individuals, rather than worsen the homelessness
crisis.
Time, distance, place, and manner of begging
Many of Washington’s
regulations are the predominant means by which
begging restrictions
municipalities attempt to avoid strict scrutiny. However,
would not survive judicial these regulations are still subject to strict scrutiny if they
facially restrict a particular type of expression, such as
scrutiny.
solicitation for donations.459 The Washington State
Supreme Court recently demonstrated its own commitment to interpreting these laws as they
are: content-based restrictions on speech in areas traditionally considered public fora.460 Put
more simply, many of Washington’s begging restrictions would not survive judicial scrutiny.
Municipalities should take careful note and begin repealing these laws that would not survive a
costly judicial challenge.
456

NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 37–38 (emphasizing that “a homeless person who has received a ticket
does not have the right to an attorney or the right to secure a jury trial . . . even though the person may be
incarcerated later for failure to pay the underlying fine”).
457
See generally Howard & Tran, supra note 91 (finding that investment in permanent housing in just two cities,
rather than utilizing criminalization strategies, could save taxpayers over $2 million in criminal justice and other
costs every year); see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 38 (reporting that “[o]ver 11 million people are cycled
through our nation’s jails each year, costing local governments approximately $22 billion annually”).
458
NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 47 (explaining that research demonstrates “permanent supportive
housing saves public resources, improves communities by reducing street homelessness, and improves the health
and well-being of homeless people”); see also NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63 (summarizing that
criminalization measures often “create additional barriers” to resources needed to escape homelessness);
Sylvestre, supra note 73, at 1 (showing how “prevalent stereotypes and prejudice faced by homeless persons as they
are policed and criminalized, both historically and in the present, are perpetuating disadvantage and have occluded
consideration of the broader structural causes of homelessness”).
459
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) see also Thayer v. City of Worchester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218,
233-34 (D. Mass. 2015).
460
See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016). Although four justices in the lead opinion held
that two particular “time, place, and manner” provisions of Lakewood’s ordinance were unconstitutional, two
other justices determined that the entire ordinance was facially overbroad, “substantially restrict[ing] protected
speech in a wide range of public forums traditionally open to First Amendment activity.” Id. at 228 (Stephens, J.,
dissenting).
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B. Repeal Laws that Apply to Peaceful Begging
Second, cities should repeal ordinances that prohibit or restrict peaceful begging. Cities
can act as gatekeepers for their resident’s constitutional rights, and they should treat that
opportunity seriously. “Our [C]onstitution enshrines the principle that government exists to
protect the rights of all citizens, and has no legitimate power to deprive any citizen or class of
citizen of their rights without due process of the law.”461 Due to the nature of these laws and
the influence of the fear of visible poverty, the laws are likely to be enforced in a discriminatory
manner,462 infringing individuals’ due process rights.
Although businesses and cities receive complaints
regarding the presence of panhandlers and the act of
Cities have no power to
begging, cities must consider the true motivation behind
deprive citizens of their
these complaints. Cities respond to the fear of visible
constitutional rights,
poverty by implementing these laws that restrict
regardless of how strong
begging.463 However, cities and local governments have
the public’s aversion to
no power to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights,
visible poverty.
regardless of how strong the public’s aversion to visible
poverty is. People experiencing homelessness are already
marginalized; cities should proactively try to protect already vulnerable groups, rather than
implementing and maintaining laws that reinforce stigma and isolation. As individuals
experiencing homelessness “become more marginalized over time. . . they are by definition
less able to access the resources needed to maintain stable housing.”464 These laws not only
criminalize constitutionally protected behavior, but they work to further marginalize
individuals experiencing homelessness and contribute to the cycle of homelessness.
The city of Olympia provides a proactive example of how cities can protect the
constitutional rights of its residents. In Olympia, the city attorney’s office routinely reads court
decisions that may affect Olympia’s municipal code.465 The attorney’s office will then discuss
potential impacts within the legal department, and will suggest to the city manager that staff
bring a proposed ordinance for the city council to amend the city code if necessary.466 After
advice from the city attorney’s office, the Olympia city council recently decided to remove

461

Is the Constitution Important?, BILL OF RIGHTS INST. (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/is-theconstitution-important/.
462
Supra Part I, Section C.
463
Supra Part I, Section A.
464
Ben Alexander-Eitzman, Substance Abuse, Marginalization, and Homelessness: Bayesian Perspectives on a
Persisting Problem, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS OPEN SCHOLARSHIP 21 (May 24, 2009),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=etd.
465
Interview with Annaliese Harksen, Deputy City Attorney/Police Legal Advisor, City of Olympia (Mar. 2, 2018).
466
Id.
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references to panhandling from its municipal code in response to Lakewood v. Willis.467
Olympia’s municipal code had prohibited panhandling within twenty-five feet of an ATM or
parking station and banned aggressive panhandling.468 Olympia defined panhandling as “any
solicitation made in person, requesting an immediate donation of money or things of
value…”469 The city noted that its definition was “problematic because of the Lakewood ruling
given that our definition targets speech based on its content—a solicitation for a donation of
money or thing of value—and prohibits that conduct in places historically recognized as a
traditional public forum, such as sidewalks and other ‘public places.’”470 The city attorney’s
office presented the city council with three options: “1. Approve the proposed ordinance
amending OMC Section 9.16.180, Pedestrian Interference on second reading. 2. Direct staff to
make different or additional amendments to OMC Section 9.16.180, Pedestrian Interference.
3. Decide not to approve the proposed ordinance. This option creates a potential liability risk
for the City.”471 The city council subsequently voted to remove references of panhandling from
its city code.472
Olympia recognized that its ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on the
freedom of speech,473 and that the Lakewood v. Willis rendered the ordinance
unconstitutional.474 Olympia’s removal of panhandling from its municipal code illustrates that
other cities within Washington can do the same thing—they can repeal ordinances that
prohibit peaceful begging. Just as Olympia identified, cities can risk liability for having laws
that restricting peaceful begging.475 At the least, that risk should motivate cities to revisit and
repeal ordinances that restrict peaceful begging.
C. Repeal Aggressive Begging Laws
Third, aggressive begging laws that are duplicative of preexisting ordinances should be
repealed unless they provide for a lower penalty for engaging in a constitutionally protected
behavior. These overlapping ordinances often result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement while simultaneously infringing on individuals’ due process rights. Cities are
prohibited from “[catering] to the preference of one group,” such as business owners or
financially secure individuals, “to avoid the expressive acts of others,” such as begging.476
467

Abby Spegman, Olympia Gets Rid of its Anti-Panhandling Rules Following State Supreme Court Decision,
OLYMPIAN (Jan. 6, 2018, 4:49 PM),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/eclips/2018%2001%2008%20Olympia%20gets%20rid%20of%2
0its%20anti%20panhandling%20rules%20following%20state%20Supreme%20Court%20decision.pdf.
468
Id.; Olympia MC § 9.16.180 (1993) (amended 2018).
469
Olympia MC § 9.16.180 (1993) (amended 2018).
470
Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author).
471
Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author).
472
Spegman, supra note 467; Olympia MC § 9.16.180 (1993) (amended 2018).
473
Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author).
474
Harksen, supra note 465.
475
As illustrated by the case studies contained in this brief. Supra Part III.
476
McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2015).
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Because these ordinances disproportionately affect visibly poor people and are content-based
restrictions on speech, they must be necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.477
Cities should examine their aggressive begging laws and determine whether those laws target
behavior already covered by other laws.
Objectively aggressive behavior is already addressed by existing laws via assault and
harassment laws. For example, the City of Kennewick recognized that its own aggressive
begging ordinance would not withstand judicial scrutiny and repealed its ordinance, noting
that its municipal code already adequately addressed the public safety concerns that its
aggressive begging law did.479 Kennewick recognized a distinction between peaceful
constitutionally protected begging and objectively aggressive behavior. Accordingly, the city
took the affirmative step of repealing its aggressive begging ordinance, both removing itself
from risk of legal liability, while respecting the
constitutional rights of its residents. Ideally, more
Existing laws already
Washington’s cities should follow and assess their antibegging laws to determine whether their laws would pass
prohibit objectively
judicial scrutiny. Further, when Olympia removed its
unlawful conduct
purportedly addressed by references to aggressive panhandling, the city did not
consider any potential negative pushback it might receive
aggressive begging
from residents or business owners because panhandling is
ordinances; cities already
protected by the United States Constitution.480 Similar to
have ways to target
Kennewick, Olympia’s Deputy City Attorney noted there
unacceptable behavior
are other laws addressing the objectively unlawful conduct
“without eroding
purportedly addressed by aggressive begging
someone’s First
ordinances—laws such as disorderly conduct and
478
harassment—which means there are other ways to target
Amendment rights.”
the unacceptable behavior “without eroding someone’s
First Amendment rights.”481
Perception-based triggers in aggressive begging laws sweep in a staggering array of
otherwise peaceful behaviors. These triggers target the speaker or the message, not the
conduct. Peaceful begging can trigger a violation because begging itself —or even just the
presence of a visibly poor person—commonly provokes feelings of anxiety, fear, or compulsion
in others. Such laws risk suppressing even lawful speech and leave cities open to vagueness
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Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–28, 2231; McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *25; Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1288, 1287–
90; see also NLCHP, Criminalization of Homelessness at 18; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 31.
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and due process challenges.482 Aggressive begging ordinances are especially troubling because
the majority of these impose criminal penalties.483
Yet these laws represent a growing trend among Washington cities. Cities implement
anti-begging laws to allegedly remedy a harm that occurs when individuals stand on the
sidewalk with a sign asking for help; however, no harm actually occurs from asking for help.484
In reality, cities are using anti-begging laws to address visible poverty, not to address
homelessness.485 Such a justification cannot support the broad curtailing of constitutional
liberties, especially one as precious and central to democracy as free speech. Aside from
constitutional concerns, Washington cities must grapple with the fact that as long as poverty
exists, some people must ask strangers for help.
D. Recognize Peaceful Begging as a Protected Plea for Help
Finally, cities should recognize peaceful begging as a
plea for help. Municipalities increasingly enact laws with the
explicit or even unconscious impact of removing visible
poverty from public view. This spike continues even though
these laws are less effective and more expensive than nonpunitive alternatives to poverty and homelessness, such as
social services and affordable housing.486

Cities should accept
that as long as poverty
exists, some people
must ask strangers for
help.

Cities should consider the implicit and unconscious biases that motivate these begging
restrictions, and with that knowledge work to be strong advocates for individuals experiencing
homelessness. Cities have the opportunity and the power to impact the lives of their residents,
how we respond to human need and human desperation reflects our collective moral compass.
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See, e.g., Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1286, 1297.
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APPENDIX
Part I: This Community Cares Flier
Referred to on page 8 of the brief, below is the flier distributed by Marysville and
Arlington.487

487

City of Arlington & City of Marysville, This Community Cares,
http://www.arlingtonwa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/918 (retrieved Oct. 17, 2017).
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Part II: Graphical Comparison of the Rise in Begging Ordinances and the Rise in
Criminalization
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Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 3.
See supra Part II.
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Part III: Methodology
A. Master Chart Methodology
HRAP researchers analyzed municipal codes laws of sixty-four cities across the state of
Washington, searching for ordinances that work to prohibit begging. At the time of selection,
the sixty-four cities chosen were the most populous in the State, with an additional few chosen
in an attempt to capture all geographic areas across the State. Researchers then used the
Municipal Research and Services Center (MSRC), a nonprofit website, to locate the municipal
codes for each city. The resulting “Master Chart” cited to throughout this brief was created and
is on file with the authors.
Using the 2010 Census, researchers collected demographic data on each of the sampled
cities. Researchers analyzed the data to determine whether there was any correlation between
a city’s ordinances and its: population density, median household income, percentage of
residents below the poverty level, and racial makeup. Researchers did not find any significant
correlations.
Using MRSC, and the search function for each municipal code being sampled, HRAP
researchers then searched the city code for references to panhandling, including key words
such as
Panhandle
Panhandling
Panhandles
Panhandler

Solicit
Soliciting
Solicits
Solicitor

Beg
Begging
Begs
Beggar

Aggressive
Solicitation
Automated Teller Machine
ATM

Researchers then manually analyzed each ordinance containing a key word. Researchers also
did a manual check of common code sections, including the criminal code, public health, park
rules, public safety, and offenses against public order sections.
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Once an ordinance was identified as a “begging restriction,” the ordinance was
classified into one of four categories: (1) zone/geographic restrictions, (2) distance restrictions,
(3) Time Restrictions, and (4) Manner restrictions (i.e. aggressive panhandling). Researchers
created the master chart, with the following categories:
Demographic Data
Total Population
Population Density (Persons per Square
Mile)
Persons Below Poverty Level, Percent, 20092013
Median Household Income, 2009-2013
Percentage Households Earning Less than
$15,000
Veterans, 2009-2013
Demographic - Caucasian, 2010
Demographic - African American, 2010
Demographic - Asian, 2010
Demographic - American Indian or Alaska
Native, 2010

Ordinance Specific Data
Total Anti-Panhandling Ordinances
Dates of Enactment-Total
Total Ordinances with Zone/Geographic
Restrictions
Total Ordinances with Distance Restrictions
Specific Ordinances with Distance
Restrictions
Dates of Enactment - Distance Restrictions
Language of Distance Restrictions: How Far
From Where?
Total Ordinances with Time Restrictions
Specific Ordinances with Time Restrictions
Dates of Enactment - Time Restrictions
Total Ordinances with "Aggressive"
Panhandling Limitations
Specific Ordinances with "Aggressive"
Panhandling Limitations
Dates of Enactment - "Aggressive"
Panhandling
"Aggressive" Panhandling Defined?
"Aggressive" Definition Based on Objective
Conduct?
"Aggressive" Definition Based on Reception?
Penalties (Civil infraction or Misdemeanor)
Progressive penalties (one that worsens with
each offense)

The data from the ordinance was inputted into the master chart: a spreadsheet created
in Microsoft Excel. Several researchers reviewed the chart at various stages to ensure accuracy.
The last review was completed in March 2018. Researchers used the “sort” function in
Microsoft Excel to sort the data in the master chart, allowing researchers to spot trends and
possible correlations. Researchers then used the “chart” function in Microsoft Word to create
the charts contained in this brief.
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B. Enforcement Data Methodology
For the enforcement data, HRAP sent requests for public record information to eleven
cities. The cities chosen were the cities used in the case study section of the brief, as well as
eight additional cities in order to obtain enforcement data on ten “aggressive begging” laws.
An example request is included in the appendix below. HRAP researchers followed up with
cities via email and phone.
Once the requests were received, researchers discovered that many cities were not
enforcing the ordinances via measures such as arrests and citations. A google search
discovered that “move-along” orders were prevalent in Centralia. Researchers then contacted
each city to ask whether the city had a routine of issuing “move-along” orders rather than
formal citations. No cities stated that they had a formal policy. However, when considering the
prevalence of move-along orders in other contexts, as well as the information discovered
regarding Centralia, researchers concluded that cities are likely issuing informal “move-along”
orders to individuals experiencing homelessness. Statements from professionals throughout
the community confirmed that move-along orders are prevalent in Seattle.
C. Scope of Methodology
While HRAP’s methodology was effective, it is not without a few restrictions. First,
HRAP researchers only considered codified ordinances. As HRAP researchers noted years
earlier in Washington’s WAR, “there is a very real risk that ordinances may have been enacted
or amended but not included in online databases.”490 Second, while researchers attempted to
use key language that would trigger most ordinances, it is possible that some ordinances
containing creative language were missed.

490

Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 48.
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Part IV: Example Public Records Request Letter
[Date]
[City Clerk]
[address]
[Via email:

]

RE: Public Records Act Request – Citation Information for [city] Municipal Code
To Whom It May Concern:
I am requesting that the records described below be made available for inspection, pursuant to
the Washington Public Records Act (RCW §42.56 et seq.). In accordance with RCW 42.56.520,
you must, within five business days of receipt of this request, respond and let me know the
status of the request and how soon you will be able to produce all discoverable records.
I am requesting certain information (see specific questions below) pertaining to citations
issued due to violations of the following [city] Municipal Code:
[specific ordinance];
[specific ordinance].
Specifically, I am requesting all relevant records related to the following questions for the time
period between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2018. Please separate each of the responses by
ordinance and by year:
1. How many total citations were issued under each of the city codes specified above, for
each year?
2. How many of these citations resulted in misdemeanor charges against the recipient?
A. How many of these charges resulted in convictions?
B. How many citation recipients spent time in jail as a result?
i.
How much time did each recipient spend in jail?
C. How many citation recipients spent time in police custody as a result of these
citations?
i.
How much time did they spend in law enforcement custody?
3. How many of these citations resulted in fines assessed against the recipient?
A. What was the amount of fines assessed for each citation?
B. How many fines were dismissed before payment?
C. How many fines were paid in full?
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D. How many fines resulted in a default?
i.
How many defaulted fines resulted in further charges, such as failure to
appear or pay charges, against the citation recipient?
4. How many of these citations resulted in a failure to appear?
5. Do you maintain records that may indicate whether a citation recipient is homeless or
staying in temporary housing such as a shelter or an encampment?
A. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people
who were experiencing homelessness?
B. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people
who were not able to provide a residential address?
C. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people
who were staying in an encampment or temporary shelter?
D. If you cannot produce the data in response to 5.A., 5.B, or 5.C, in how many
instances did recipients of these citations provide the same residential address?
Put another way, in how many instances was the same address recorded for
recipients of these citations?
6. What was the race of each individual cited if identified?
7. What was the gender of each individual cited if identified?
8. For citations issued under [ordinance number], how many of those citation recipients
simultaneously received citations for assault [applicable ordinance number], battery
[applicable ordinance number], or harassment [applicable ordinance number].
A. Among the results for request #8, how many of these defendants was offered
(or accepted) a plea deal?
If the City of [city name] does not track the data related to any of the requests above, please
let us know.
At this time, please refrain from making hard copies of any responsive documents. The
production of data in electronic form is preferred. If the records are available electronically,
please specify what electronic forms are available, as well as any cost associated with
accessing this electronic form. You may send any written responses to this request by email to
[name and email] or by mail to:
[mailing address]
If any documents or responses are withheld in whole or in part, please specify the reason for
withholding such document or response or any portion thereof. To the extent that portions of
the request are specifically exempted from disclosure, please provide all non-exempt portions
as allowed for under the Washington Public Records Act. To the extent that any portion of the
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requested records contain classified information, please redact such information and furnish
the requested records.
We very much appreciate your attention to this request. If you would like to contact me with
questions or concerns about the requested information, please feel free to do so as I am more
than happy to clarify in any way I can. Please contact me with any questions at [contact
information].
I look forward to hearing from you within five business days. Thank you for your assistance!
Sincerely,
[Name]
[Affiliation]
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